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Introduction: Keynes’ Children in the 1970s 
“Objective conditions have never made socialism seem so necessary and so 
achievable. Capitalism’s self-justification as the natural means of meeting human needs 
and expanding human possibilities seems more obviously groundless than ever, with 
every structure of the economy out of joint with human needs… moreover, the means – or 
at least the groundwork – for achieving such a society, the organizations created by 
working people themselves, have grown… as the crisis has deepened.” – Hilary 
Wainwright, Beyond the Fragments (1979) 
 
In the midst of the Great Depression, John Maynard Keynes wrote a pithy tract  
envisioning an optimistic future in which the “economic problem” no longer exists.1 In 
Economic Possibilies for Our Grandchildren, he posited in 1930 that the generation of 
his grandchildren would be freed from the struggle for subsistence, because of the 
tremendous growth in productivity; the opportunity to transcend economic insecurity 
would be a world-historical moment, in which humanity overcomes what “always has 
been hitherto the primary, most pressing problem of the human race” and faces a 
delightful prospect of emancipation from economic imperatives.2 In the past centuries or 
even millenia, freedom from alienating labor was the privilege for the few, directly 
dependent upon exploitation of the mass of workers; because of technological 
transformations, Keynes posited, the realm of freedom could soon be universally 
accessible.  
 We are the Keynes’ grandchildren. Keynes’ predictions of economic possibilities, 
that of dramatic economic growth and increase in productivity, came true; however, we 
are nowhere near the realm of freedom that he argued would accompany the growth. In 
fact, the vista of liberation from economic necessities has been receding from us for the 
past three decades, characterized by persistent, structural unemployment and the rise in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  John	  Maynard	  Keynes,	  “Economic	  Possibilities	  of	  Our	  Grandchildren,”	  in	  Essays	  in	  Persuation,	  New	  York	  
and	  London:	  W.W.	  Norton,	  1963.	  358-­‐373.	  366.	  
2	  Ibid.	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precarious employment, expanding economic inequality and poverty, increased reliance 
on debt, and contraction of the social services. The ongoing global economic crisis 
following the collapse of neoliberalism is threatening to further erode social welfare in 
the name of unavoidable austerity, and it is almost impossible to imagine that “the 
economic problem may be… at least within sight of solution, within a hundred years” of 
his writing (which is, by 2030).3 To understand why the astounding growth in output and 
productivity in the latter half of the 20th century did not lead to the corresponding 
expansion of freedom is one of the most fundamental political, economic, sociological 
and historical questions that we must understand in the contemporary Western world.  
  The primary key to the puzzle lies in the 1970s.4 The 1970s was the turning point 
in postwar history. Until the 1970s, the workers’ class power, the welfare state and social 
mobility expanded dramatically, full employment and unions’ power reinforced each 
other, and society was becoming less plagued with inequality and insecurity. The basic 
economic security spawned a widespread movement for social freedom from hierarchy 
and especially gendered oppressions, as well as from excesses of industrial pollution and 
militarization, since the 1960s. The 1970s was also a time of economic crisis and a 
contestation over a basic paradigm of political economy, as the postwar Fordist-
Keynesian consensus was called into question. It was the political struggles fought 
among the Keynes’ children - both in a generational and ideational sense – that gave 
neoliberal (counter-)revolutions to his grandchildren. Neoliberalism began in the 1980s, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Ibid.	  
4	  This	  thesis	  focuses	  most	  intensively	  on	  the	  period	  of	  the	  Labour	  government	  between	  1974	  and	  1979,	  
since	  the	  most	  consequential	  events	  happened	  in	  these	  years.	  However,	  1970s	  is	  meant	  to	  cover	  the	  
“long	  seventies,”	  the	  entire	  period	  of	  the	  contestation	  of	  the	  Fordist-­‐Keynesianism	  in	  economic,	  social	  
and	  political	  sense	  -­‐	  starting	  with	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  Wilson	  government	  in	  1964,	  ending	  either	  with	  
Thatcher’s	  victory	  in	  May	  1979,	  defeat	  of	  the	  left-­‐led	  Labour	  in	  1983,	  or	  most	  conclusively,	  the	  defeat	  of	  
the	  Great	  Miners’	  Strike	  in	  1985.	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but we must trace it to the political struggles of the 1970s which spawned it in the end. 
There have been substantial differences between countries in regards to the ways and the 
extent to which neoliberalism spread, but the general trend has been consistent on both 
sides of the North Atlantic. The 1970s was a moment in which the noblest experiment in 
capitalist history – if not human history – of a society free from economic bondage came 
closest, and withered away. 
 This thesis focuses on the politics of the seventies in the United Kingdom, 
because of the particular acuteness of the stagflationary crisis and the degree of its 
paradigmatic shift from the Keynesian welfare state to the Thatcherite laboratory. 
Extremity of Thatcherism is especially illuminated in contrast with the strength of the 
organized labor and the Left in the ‘70s. Labour Party was in government for ten out of 
fifteen years preceding Thatcher, and their failure to construct a durable regime of 
political economy in place of the declining Fordism was necessary for neoliberalism to 
emerge. Political scientist Peter Hall characterized the British trajectory an instance of 
“third order change”, a paradigm shift of rare occurrence.5 The decline of Keynesian-
Labourism and the rise of Thatcherism in Britain are close to an ideal-typical example of 
the global shift from Fordism to neoliberalism, and its historical significance cannot be 
overstated. While neoliberalism came to many other countries in a much less drastic and 
ideologically-charged manner, the British case best highlights the dynamic of a regime 
shift. 
 To understand the path taken by the Labour Party and the unions, this thesis 
focuses on the ideas held by them; in particular, productivism and masculinism. The role 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Peter	  Hall,	  “Policy	  Paradigms,	  Learning,	  and	  the	  State:	  the	  Case	  of	  Economic	  Policymaking	  in	  Britain,”	  
Comparative	  Politics	  25:3,	  Apr	  1993.	  275-­‐296.	  279.	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of ideas often tends to be under-emphasized in political science research, but it is an 
integral aspect in understanding of political change, continuity and agency. The Labour 
Party’s reformist, anti-radical tendency is well known, but their attachment to 
productivism - the notion that privileges perpetual increase in economic growth and 
capacity for consumption - and the male breadwinner family wage model also locked 
them in a box which rendered it unable for them to envision alternative regimes and aims 
of political economy.  
The outline of the thesis is as follows. In the first chapter, I explore the possibility 
of an emancipatory economy, inspired by the visions of Andre Gorz. The idea of an 
alternative serves as a contrast with the actual trajectory of labor politics and political 
economy throughout the thesis. The following chapter situates the thesis on a firm 
theoretical basis by examining institutionalism in political science and the role of ideas in 
institutionalism; the analysis is conducted through the lens of the dialectical interaction 
between ideas and institutions and the concept of ideational path dependence. The third 
chapter examines the development of Labour governments’ social policy and the social 
wage, and the following chapter focuses on industrial relations and the Social Contract 
between unions and the Labour government. The third and fourth chapters provide 
empirical material based on the experience of labor politics in the ‘70s Britain. I conclude 
the thesis with an observation of the implications of its failure.  
  
	   7	  
Chapter 1: Post-Fordism That Never Was 
 
“We do not want to enter the age of abundance, only to find that we have lost the 
values which might teach us how to enjoy it.” - Anthony Crosland, the Future of 
Socialism (1956) 
 
“Another World is Possible” is a slogan of the World Social Forum, a network of 
the alter-globalization movement in the early 21st century. The slogan was coined as a 
response to the most emblematic credo of the neoliberal hegemony, the Thatcherite 
refrain of “There Is No Alternative.” The assertion of neoliberalism as destiny has been 
the most effective way to discursively supress the opposition to the new order that 
emerged at the end of the 1970s. Therefore, it is imperative to envision a potential non-
neoliberal development of political economy. What would an economic system for 
“Keynes’ grandchildren” look like? In this chapter, I describe the blueprint of an 
emancipatory arrangement which could have been built since the ‘70s, had it not been for 
political obstacles.  
 
 
The Crisis of Fordism 
The transition of a dominant mode of production throughout the Western 
advanced capitalist world from Fordism to neoliberalism is one of the most significant 
events in the history of capitalism. The Fordist regime of political-economic regulation,   
as a combination of labor control practices, constellations of political power, technology 
and consumption patterns which interacted with each other, reigned throughout Western 
Europe since the 1940s.6 Taylorist scientific management was widely employed to boost 
productivity and profitability in the economy based on mass industrial production, which 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  David	  Harvey,	  the	  Condition	  of	  Postmodernity:	  an	  Enquiry	  into	  the	  Origins	  of	  Cultural	  Change.	  Oxford:	  
Blackwell,	  1989.	  124.	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achieved constant high growth rates. Industrial production was based upon stable 
socioeconomic relations between concentrated capital and well-organized yet moderate 
labor. The Keynesian welfare state and higher wages won by labor’s strength in 
organized collective bargaining served to mitigate capitalism’s contradiction of 
overproduction by institutionally boosting the worker’s power, and the material benefits 
that the workers gained from the Fordist system were used to secure labor’s consent to 
alienating labor process of Taylorism. There were certainly differences in the way and the 
extent to which Fordism was applied within Western Europe; for example, the 
introduction of Taylorism came later in Italy and France, and even in Britain the shop 
stewards were able to resist full-fledged Taylorism until the 1960s. However, the general 
trend of the Fordist-Keynesian settlement is evident; after the devastation of two word 
wars, the class struggles in Western Europe saw a sustained compromise, which was 
hardly satisfactory for socialists yet represented a crucial gain for workers and citizens. 
 As the rigidity of Fordist production started to hamper growth rates in the late 
1960s, “inability of Fordism and Keynesianism to contain the inherent contradictions of 
capitalism” began to manifest.7 Various explanations have been advanced for the crisis 
and decline of Fordism; one of the most conspicuous causes was the four-fold increase in 
oil prices following the OPEC embargo in 1973. However, the internal contradictions of 
capitalism, such as the tendency of overproduction, also threatened the system saddled 
with the saturation of the consumer market and the expanded productive capacities. 
Growth rates slackened, and the distributional conflicts between labor and capital and the 
fiscal tension between social policy commitments and stagnating fiscal capacities of the 
state intensified. At the beginning of the crisis, extraordinarily loose monetary policy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Harvey,	  Condition,	  142.	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the major economies between 1969-73 enabled them to postpone the decisive resolution 
of these conflicts – though at the expense of rising inflation rates, which quickly turned 
into stagflation by the mid-1970s.8 At the same time, the institutional strength of trade 
unions, enhanced by low levels of structural unemployment in Fordism, empowered them 
in the intensified class struggles in which they had the determination to take part. In the 
1970s, not only was labor powerful, but also the Left was gaining strength within the 
labor movements. It seemed that just as the previous structural crisis had led to the 
strengthened power of the workers in the form of Keynesian compromise, the late-Fordist 
crisis could give way to an even more democratic and egalitarian society. As Eduard 
Bernstein conceptualized in his vision of evolutionary socialism, social democracy could 
finally fulfill its historic mission of “democracy… [as] the highest possible degree of 
freedom for all” through liberal, parliamentary, advanced capitalist democracy.9  
 Except it was not to be. The 1970s was an apogee of the Left power, but their 
demise was in the making. Beginning in the late 1960s, the Western world saw 
advancement of the leftist mobilizations in many countries. The iconic May 1968 in 
France saw a spectacular rise of the New Left student movement demanding autonomy 
and liberation from alienation, followed by the largest general wildcat strike in history. 
Massive labor militancy and the student movement also radicalized each other in the 
Italian Hot Autumn of 1969. In Sweden, the unions put forward a proposal for the wage-
earner fund, an epitome of a plan for peaceful, gradual, parliamentary transition to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Ibid.,	  145	  
9	  Eduard	  Bernstein,	  Evolutionary	  Socialism:	  a	  Criticism	  and	  Affirmation,	  New	  York:	  B.	  W.	  Huebsch,	  1911.	  
143.	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socialism.10 Throughout Europe and beyond, New Left movements of feminism and 
environmentalism were matched with the resurgence of Marxism and labor militancy. 
However, the intensified class struggles were resolved decisively in favor of 
capital by the 1980s, to a varying degree yet almost without exception throughout the 
Western advanced capitalist world. A host of capital-friendly policies including assaults 
on union power and on egalitarian social policies followed, and the persistence of 
heightened structural unemployment further eroded the organized power of labor and 
exacerbated the inequality and precarity of workers. The triumphant neoliberals jubilantly 
proclaimed that the Right turn after Fordism was destined. Feminism and 
environmentalism fared less worse than did workers in neoliberal post-Fordism, but they 
also waned in the face of accelerating consumerism, apolitical individualism and virulent 
social conservatism in some countries. 
  
 Productivism and Limits to Economic Growth  
 Since the 1960s, the productivist paradigm - the notion that human well-being 
fundamentally depends on the level of material possessions and consumption - faced 
mounting social contestations. Environmental consciousness and grassroots ecological 
movements rose as a reaction to the years of material growth. The concerns of the 
popular movements were reflected the United Nations’ first Conference on Human 
Environment in 1972, and the influential elite think tank Club of Rome published a 
provocatively-titled Limits to Growth in the same year, arguing that the carrying capacity 
of the finite planet would render continual economic growth impossible at some time in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  For	  details	  of	  the	  wage-­‐earner	  fund,	  see	  John	  D.	  Stephens,	  the	  Transition	  	  from	  Capitalism	  to	  Socialism.	  
Urbana,	  IL:	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Press,	  1986.	  Ch.	  6.	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the near-future. Considering that the systemic economic crisis was occuring in the midst 
of burgeoning green and post-materialist consciousness, a potential alternative would 
have been the one that constitutes a fundamental break with the producvitist logic of 
Fordism, characterized by growth imperatives and consumerist values.  
The exceptionally high rates of growth in the Fordist years are unlikely to be 
always repeated, let alone perpetually sustained. The uninterrupted technological 
innovation is hardly guaranteed, to say the least; the rate of productivity growth started to 
see a structural decline in the 1970s, despite a plethora of policies to stimulate growth 
through encouraging technological innovations; these policies were promoted by  
productivists both on the Left and the Right in Britain, as they were especially concerned 
with its slower growth rate compared to other major OECD countries. Especially the 
production of services is resistant to continual, exponential growth, due to its inherently 
labor-intensive nature. Furthermore, ecological and natural resource constraints cannot be 
ignored. As the Club of Rome noted, since the available natural resources and absorbing 
capacities of the ecosystem are finite, perpetual growth is impossible, and the scarcity in 
natural resources would eventually slow down growth; the economic system which 
severely discounts the ecological impact of productive activities accelerate such trend.11 
Indeed, the acute crisis of the 1970s was precipitated by the shortage of crucial natural 
resources; even though the shortage was artifically created, the severe constraints on 
economic growth due to energy shortage are likely to manifest within the next few 
decades.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11	  See	  Herman	  Daly,	  Beyond	  Growth:	  the	  Economics	  of	  Sustainable	  Development,	  Boston:	  Beacon	  Press,	  
1996	  for	  recent	  analysis.	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One of the main reasons that economic growth is regarded as the foremost goal of 
political economy is its necessity for providing employment and/or any other means of 
attaining livelihood for the entire population. Labor movements and social democrats are 
particularly invested in the welfare-preserving functions of economic growth, since in the 
absence of counterveiling measures, reduction in growth would lead to an increase in 
unemployment. However, the logic of continued economic growth distorts the economy 
towards expending resources far beyond what is necessary for maintaining welfare of 
citizens. To maintain economic growth, the demand for products must also continually 
rise; hence, there arises an imperative of need-creation for the sake of growth. Indeed, 
saturation of demand for products was one of the root causes of the crisis of Fordism, and 
capitalists developed sophisticated advertising techniques in order to manufacture the 
needs that had previously not existed.12 The production of superfluous goods and the 
constant creation of needs are regarded as necessary for the maintainance of livelihood 
through employment (which serves to produce those goods in the first place) and the 
welfare state. The alternative, more liberatory solution would be for a society to decide to 
produce services and goods with high use values while expending the minimally 
necessary labor time.  
 The labor movement opposition to such an alternative is almost invariably based 
on economistic notion of their interests, most succinctly expessed in Samuel Gompers’ 
statement in the late 19th century - “we do want more, and when it becomes more, we 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12	  Jean	  Baudrillard,	  For	  a	  Critique	  of	  the	  Political	  Economy	  of	  the	  Sign.	  Trans.	  Charles	  Levin.	  St.	  Louis,	  MO:	  
Telos	  Press,	  1981.	  (Originally	  published	  in	  1972).	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shall still want more.”13 Labor needs to advocate for perpetual economic growth if, and 
only if, they subscribe to economism. Indeed, British unions mostly did, even though the 
absolute level of material wealth was vastly different from the Victorian misery. As they 
were strengthened by favorable full employment conditions, they used the power to 
demand the wage growth faster than the productivity growth. Certainly, labor is ethically 
entitled to fight for lowering the rate of exploitation. However, such wage offensives did 
accompany inflation, which opened a way for the rightist “solution” which purposefully 
undermined the labor’s structural power. An aggressive wage offensive by strengthened 
unions would lead to inflation to an extent the workers spend their increased income on 
consumption rather than savings and firms are able to pass the increased wage costs onto 
the consumers, thus erasing the original gains made by the workers.14 That unions 
partially “caused” inflation needs not necessarily be an anti-union argument; inflation is a 
symptom of the lack of decisive solutions in the class struggle. Inflation was particularly 
acute in the 1970s Britain, and even though inflation was deployed as a reason to 
discipline the organized labor, the problem could not simply be wished away by the Left. 
Radical labor movements could (and indeed did) press for the lowering of real 
exploitation rates through price freezes and socialist measures which prevent 
unemployment rates from rising even as the rate of profit decline. However, besides 
formidable political obstacles against such strategy and the inflationary effects of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Samuel	  Gompers,	  “an	  Address	  in	  Louisville,”	  in	  Stuart	  B.	  Kaufman	  (ed.),	  the	  Samuel	  Gompers	  Papers:	  
Volume	  2,	  the	  Early	  Years	  of	  the	  American	  Federation	  of	  Labor,	  1887-­‐90.	  Champaign,	  IL:	  University	  of	  
Illinois	  Press,	  1987.	  313.	  (Originally	  published	  in	  1890.)	  
14	  The	  impact	  of	  inflation	  would	  not	  be	  equally	  distributed	  among	  the	  workers;	  the	  better	  organized,	  
skilled	  sections	  of	  the	  working	  class	  could	  win	  the	  wage	  increase	  greater	  than	  the	  inflation	  rate,	  at	  the	  
expense	  of	  less	  organized	  or	  skilled	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rising share of wages vis-à-vis profits15, the expectation of continually rising wages are 
dependent upon the high growth rates; there would be a limit for what labor can gain by 
reducing the share of capital. Unlike the rate of exploitation, the rate of growth in 
production or productivity could not be altered through political solutions. 
 Therefore, it is a defeating proposition for the Left to continue defining their 
primary aim as the perpetual increase in workers’ ability to consume. The sustainable 
Social Democratic-Keynesian regime of regulation – as well as a socialist economy - 
requires a coordinated wage policy that could be restrained if necessary; indeed, such was 
the rationale behind the voluntary incomes policy of the Social Contract between the 
unions and the Labour Government. However, obediently accepting the sustained rate of 
profit could hardly be the most desirable strategy for the empowered unions. Because the 
claim for more consumption is unsustainable and the restraint without reward is clearly 
undesirable, the moment of the systemic crisis of the productivist regime was an 
opportune moment for the inheritors of the emancipatory tradition to ask fundamental 
questions of political economy, rather than taking the growth-based paradigm for granted. 
What are the aims of political economy and what policy measures are necessary to 
achieve them? Should the productivity increase be translated into more production or 
more freedom? In the age in which the productive capacities are developed enough to be 
able to provide the basic needs for the entire population without further growth, the more 
freedom from, and freedom in, wage labor looms large as a viable alternative. Indeed, 
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Marx never saw material consumption for its own sake as a primary agenda for the Left; 
in his original vision, increased production and productivity were merely a means to 
achieve higher goals of freedom and self-actualization.  
The regime that eventually replaced the high-growth postwar economy was fully 
based on the productivist logic of capitalism, even though it was less successful in 
growing the GDP. The structural unemployment sharply rose in the post-Fordist era, and 
the regime of “flexible accumulation” also created highly insecure and irregular forms of 
jobs such as contract and temporary employment, as the great amounts of work were 
rendered unnecessary by technological evolution.16 The post-Fordist unemployment or 
precarious employment is not only detrimental in terms of income security, but also for 
their social status and self-esteem due to the socio-cultural “ingrained normality of 
employment and a steady job” as well as, crucially, for the organized labor’s collective 
power.17 As existentialist-socialist theorist Andre Gorz emphatically argues, the 
neoliberal economy presents “free time as a disaster, as social death.”18 Society was 
confronted with a choice between “a society of unemployment still productivist and 
grossly unequal, or a society of free time where self-determined, non-market activities 
predominate over waged work with economic goals.”19 The outcome of the struggles of 
the 1970s led to the former, extinguishing the vista of the latter. 
 
Non-Productivist Political Economy 
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  Andre	  Gorz,	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  Boston:	  South	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  Press,	  1985.	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  Informal	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Philadelphia:	  Temple	  University	  Press,	  1992.	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18	  Gorz,	  Paths,	  71	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The increased productivity achieved in the Fordist-Keynesian years opened up a 
society’s possibility to reach the realm of freedom, as Keynes had predicted. The realm of 
freedom would require a distribution of work in a rational and organized manner, and 
decoupling of work from attainment of livelihood. For a political economy to maintain 
full employment in a non-growth condition without imposing insecurity and 
powerlessness on the part of workers, a well-organized scheme of work sharing is 
essential. In a society in which massive savings in working time have been made, 
working time of individual workers must be cut in an orderly manner so that it can 
facilitate worker’s freedom and sense of autonomy rather than be manifested in high 
unemployment caused by technological progress. State-sanctioned working time 
regulations or collective bargaining agreements that stipulate working time reduction on 
the basis of work sharing would transform the “system which makes unprecedented 
savings of working time, but turns that time into a disaster for those who save it”.20 
Working time in many European countries have been declining, but very slowly; the 35-
hour workweek instituted by the French Socialists in 1999 and the Dutch scheme of work 
sharing and the industry-wide collective agreements on 38-hour workweek are the 
examples of more systematic policies for working-time reduction, but they have hardly 
led to a paradigm shift. A non-productivist economy with reduced production and 
working time would also be more sustainable, since it exhausts ecological capacities and 
natural resources at a slower speed.  
The other core policy for the anti-productivist Left must be social rights of all 
citizens to a satisfactory livelihood, which are not conditional upon one’s sale of labor 
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  Press,	  1999.	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power. One way to realize such rights is through universal basic income, which is “an 
income paid by a political community to all its members on an individual basis, without 
means test or work requirement,” as defined by its most prominent theorist Philippe van 
Parijs.21 However, there are numerous varieties of a basic income scheme with widely 
divergent implications, including the “negative income tax” (NIT) proposal most 
prominently advocated for by the libertarian Right such as Milton Friedman and Charles 
Murray. The NIT leaves the basic income at “subsistence” level and abolishes all other 
forms of income transfer programmes in order to make them work at a lower wage level; 
in this case, basic income would effectively be functioning as a subsidy for employers for 
the labor power, in a Speenhamland style. In contrast, the, emancipatory form of basic 
income would provide a “sufficient social income” that “enables them to refuse work and 
reject ‘inhuman’ working conditions”.22 As such, basic income is a more complete form 
of decommodification of labor power; basic income would realize reduction of working 
time – or rather, the workers’ right to reduce their working time – by removing the 
compulsion to sell their labor power to maintain their livelihood. 
Anti-productivist working time reduction and basic income would result in the 
elevation of the non-market realm as a sphere of activity. If a society is to prioritize the 
distribution of wealth as free time rather than money, enriching aspects of life must be 
found in the sphere of non-market activities; indeed, the recognition of spontaneous 
“lifeworld” as a source of emancipation would undergird any plausible form of leftist 
anti-productivist politics. Andre Gorz conceptualizes the two distinct social spheres as 
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that of autonomy and heteronomy; the former is a “convivial society” in which 
emancipation and satisfaction are sought, while the latter is the sphere of necessity, the 
functional imperatives of collectivities whose existence the former requires. Gorzian 
“post-industrial socialism” is based on “a synergetic relation between the heteronomous 
and autonomous modes of production, aiming at the utmost expansion of the sphere of 
autonomy.”23  
 
Gender and the Social Wage Economy 
An alternative that expands the sphere of autonomy must be liberatory for all 
workers, regardless of gender. Astonishing development of the second-wave feminism 
since the late 1960s substantially changed politics of gender, which influences the 
operations of the entire economy including conditions of domestic production and 
reproduction of labor power. Putting a limit on the market sphere certainly coincides with 
the feminist aim of valorizating non-market and/or care work. However, consideration of 
care work must be fully taken into account in the division between the spheres of 
freedom and necessity. In a quest to minimize the sphere of necessary production, Gorz 
tends to limit the sphere of necessity to manufacturing, infrastructure or industrial 
activities, such as “railway networks and electricity grids”, “telephones, video machines, 
microprocessors,” “a limited range of sturdy, functional shoes and clothing with an 
optimal use-value” and “high-technology [medical] treatment.”24 Care work is a socially 
necessary service, yet he argues that the distinction between “productive and reproductive 
labour” should not be blurred since “the private character of domestic actities” based on 
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“spontaneous behaviour between persons” is crucial to the “emotional value” produced 
domestic labor.25  
The notion that socially necessary care labor can be, and indeed should be, 
performed in the sphere of autonomy relies upon the ideology and social expectation of 
altruistic care. The exaltation of altruism and caring values in themselves is an integral 
aspect of emancipatory post-productivist society. However, care labor is necessary rather 
than extraneous for the reproduction of society, and necessary labor cannot be guaranteed 
to be free; the sphere of necessity is not limited to the level of material production. The 
extremely gendered nature of care activities cannot simply be ignored; when the 
distinction between care labor and care as spontaneous activity are blurred, the social 
expectation of care labor in the ostensibly “autonomous” sphere would not be so different 
from the currently dominant, masculinist ideology of domestic altruism that justifies 
women’s unpaid labor and denial of power relationships within private households. The 
market-based compulsion or the state bureaucracy are not the only sources of unfreedom. 
Oppressive social norms could very well persist in the autonomous sphere; as Fraser 
argued in her critique of the Habermasian lifeworld, the colonization of the lifeworld by 
the system (or the sphere of autonomy by heteronomy) is not a unidirectional process; 
“the social meanings of gender [created in the lifeworld] still structure… official 
economic and state systems,” she writes.26 While Gorz did not advocate for such gender 
inegalitarian measures, the compatibility of non-productivist autonomous society with 
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patriarchal gender relations is explicitly demonstrated by Ivan Illich, whose theories 
strongly influenced Gorz. Illich actively promotes the separation of spheres based on 
gender due to its prominence in the “convivial” sphere free from market relations, 
arguing that the decline of gender roles constitutes a sinister aspect of capitalism and 
modernity.27  
 The policy implications of such feminist contradictions are manifested most 
clearly in the implications of the basic income.  As noted above, basic income, at least in 
its full, emancipatory forms, is anti-productivist and at the same time drastically reduces 
economic dependency upon private entities, whether they be capitalists or breadwinner 
husbands. Carole Pateman ardently defends basic income from democratic as well as 
feminist perspectives. By freeing domestic relationships from dependency and creating a 
wider room for non-employment activities for all individuals, Pateman argues, that basic 
income could “help break the long-standing link between income and employment, end 
the mutual reinforcement of the institutions of marriage, employment and citizenship.”28 
Furthermore, basic income could be considered as a compensation for the non-market, 
feminine-gendered care work. However, not all scholars share her optimistic assessments 
that “men might… use their basic income to take on their fair share of the caring work”.29 
As Barbara Bergmann argues, basic income would most likely lead to more unpaid 
domestic labor mostly undertaken by women, reducing women’s employment and 
additional income from paid work while reinforcing constricting gender roles and 
discrimination, unless gendered nature of production and reproduction activities is 
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significantly weakned before the introduction of the scheme.30 After all, basic income is 
not correlated to the amount of care/domestic work one performs, and as Fraser reminds 
us, the lifeworld free from the “system” – which is enabled by basic income - is not a 
paradise of autonomy. Ingrid Robeyns, in her comprehensive analysis of the plausible 
gendered impacts of basic income, adopts both sides of the arguments and concludes that 
the intra-feminist debate over basic income “boils down to the different underlying 
concepts of emancipation… regard[ing whether] the gendered division of labor [is] the 
core of gender injustice” or not.31 Employment is both a source of empowerment and 
unfreedom; Robeyns’ summary elucidates a certain tension within feminisms between 
equal employment as the source of independent livelihood, status and dignity and the 
valorization of non-market and/or care work. 
 Robeyns sensibly proposes that “a basic income should be supplemented with 
other social policy measures that liberate women (and at the same time men) from gender 
role expectations”, and proposes policies to encourage dual-earner, dual-carer society 
such as non-transferable, individual parental leave, effective implementation of rigorous 
employment equality legislations, and foremost of all, comprehensive child care 
provisions.32 However, rather than considering these policies as simply compensating the 
defects of basic income, I suggest that the feminist labor market and social policies can 
be in themselves integral aspects of the post-productivist, feminist system of political 
economy. The public, care service-based economy centered around the “social wage” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  Barbara	  Bergmann,	  “a	  Swedish-­‐Style	  Welfare	  State	  or	  Basic	  Income:	  Which	  Should	  Have	  Priority?,”	  	  
Politics	  &	  Society	  32:1	  (2004),	  107-­‐118.	  	  
31	  Ingrid	  Robeyns,	  “Hush	  Money	  or	  Emancipation	  Fee?	  A	  Gender	  Analysis	  of	  Basic	  Income”	  in	  Robert	  van	  
der	  Veen	  and	  Loek	  Groot	  (eds.),	  Basic	  Income	  on	  the	  Agenda:	  Policy	  Objectives	  and	  Political	  Chances,	  
Amsterdam:	  Amsterdam	  University	  Press,	  2000.	  121-­‐136.	  135.	  
32	  Robeyns,	  “Hush	  Money”,	  132-­‐133,	  Ingrid	  Robeyns,	  “Will	  a	  Basic	  Income	  Do	  Justice	  to	  Women?”,	  
Analyse	  &	  Kritik	  23/2001,	  88-­‐105.	  103.	  	  	  
	   22	  
concept properly values and compensates for care labor without entrenching the gendered 
separation into domestic labor, promotes dual-earner, dual-carer society and optimal 
freedom from waged work at the same time as employment equality, and takes use value 
of production into account by focusing on socially desirable production of care services, 
which are also more sustainable since they are much less environmentally damaging and 
resource intensive. Other forms of socially desirable and emancipatory services, such as 
free education at all levels and highly subsidized public transportation, should also be 
considered as part of the public social wage economy. The public production and 
guaranteed provision of care services does not necessarily mean uniform and 
unresponsive bureaucratic controls over the character of the services. The role of the state 
must be to ensure the high levels of resources devoted to social services provisions, while 
the content of the services could be determined in a more decentralized, democratic and 
engaging manner. 
 The social wage economy can be contrary to the capitalist tendencies, and hence 
the mechanisms of capitalism would function to systematically obstract such possibilities. 
The realization of the substantial parts of such platform would have to involve successful 
political imposition of significant constraints on the power of capital through capital and 
exchange controls, due to the capital’s power to precipitate economic crises by halting 
investment or fleeing the country. Public control of major financial institutions, pension 
funds or some variant of the wage-earner fund would enable investment decisions to be 
decoupled from profitability; the profitability criteria systematically diverges from the 
prioritized production of socially-beneficial services. However, even without the full 
transition to socialism, an expansion of public services and public employment can be 
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achieved to a certain extent through enhanced fiscal capacities of the state. In the 
“trilemma of the service economy” that Torben Iversen and Anne Wren demonstrated, 
income equality and full (shared) employment are achievable if “budgetary restraint” – 
lower levels of taxation – is sacrificed. Since tax-financed public services provide high 
use value and empower citizens to be free, the welfare of the people would be enhanced 
through such policies.33  
 Second-wave feminism trenchantly criticized the masculinist “family wage” 
model and envisioned the emancipatory alternatives outlined above. They were not 
realized, but their demand for the expansion of women’s employment opportunities was; 
women’s employment certainly has not become equal, but the substantial expansion of 
female labor force was accomplished alongside the transition to neoliberalism. As women 
workers formed the basis of often flexible, part-time labor force so characteristic of the 
neoliberal economy and the expansion of employment force did coincide with capital’s 
priorities, Nancy Fraser critically notes that “the dream of women’s emancipation [was] 
harnessed to the engine of capital accumulation.”34 Precarious, peripheral labor did not 
necessarily free women workers from economic dependency, and for those who could 
claim economic independence, the “double burden” of waged labor and domestic labor 
lengthened their working time and intensified their burden of labor as unfreedom. 
Furthermore, the neoliberal welfare state retrenchment exacerbated women’s unequal 
opportunities in the labor market due to their unpaid domestic labor. 
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The transitional policies outlined above were indeed proposed in a number of left-
wing programmes in the 1970s. Besides the Swedish wage-earner fund which was 
championed by its trade union central, the French Socialist Party’s 1981 manifesto “110 
Propositions for France” contained similar provisions. In Britain, the Alternative 
Economic Strategy proposed by the Labour Left contained these platforms. However, as 
analyzed in detail in the later chapters, not only did the AES and other leftist agendas fail 
to gain momentum, most variants were heavily productivist and lacked feminist 
perspectives. The ideas on the aims of the Left politics held by its advocate played the 
crucial role in shaping their programmes; in the next chapter, the role of ideas in 
contestations over political economy is examined in detail.	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Chapter 2: Ideas and Political Economy  
 
“It is a paradox that scholars, whose entire existence is centered on the 
production and understanding of ideas, should grant ideas so little significance for 
explaining political life.” – Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions (1991) 
 
Structuralism and Its Discontents 
"We used to think that you could spend your way out of a recession and increase 
employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I tell you in all candour 
that that option no longer exists” – Prime Minister James Callaghan (in)famously 
declared the death of Keynesianism to the horrified Labour Party membership at the 
Party’s Annual Conference in September 1976. Milton Friedman recognized Callaghan’s 
admission of the neoliberal idea that underlied his remark, describing it as a “courageous 
talk.”35 Why did the government by the Labour Party, which had seen leftist resurgence 
in 1970s, adopt a framework of ideas so congruent with the New Right – however 
haphazardly or reluctantly – so much so that Thatcher’s victory could be called 
“consolidation of what was already under way throughout much of the 1970s”?36  
Numerous thinkers have put forward a structuralist explanation based on the 
nature of international capitalism. Structuralist Marxists argue that it was simply a 
functioning of capitalism’s law of motion; capitalism could only give Keynesian 
concessions to the proletariat if the growth rates are sufficiently high, but in the times of 
stagnating economy and inflation caused by the inability to solve competing claims in 
class struggles over the diminishing surplus, capital is bound to win because the profit 
rate is inviolable. David Harvey argues that the ultimate defeat of labor and the welfare 
state was an inevitable outcome dictated by the logic of capitalism, no matter how 
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ethically repugnant such logic is. The retrenchment in social policy commitments and 
containment of the wage levels were an economic necessity which governments of all 
stripes needed to follow. “The gradual withdrawal of support for the welfare state… 
began as an economic necessity in the crisis of 1973-75,” Harvey argues, and that 
Britain’s acceptance of the IMF loan and dictates of austerity in 1976 was “a simple 
acknowledgement of external financial power over internal politics.”37 David Coates 
emphasizes the limitation of options available for the Labour government, which was 
“trapped between powerful international agencies and institutions… which acted as the 
mechanism by which the imperatives of capitalist crises were transformed into policy” 
which could not but be a proto-neoliberal one.38 Thatcherites and orthodox Marxists 
converge to argue that There Is No Alternative (within capitalism) except for 
neoliberalism. 
Structuralist Marxists argue that the power relations inherent in capitalism 
significantly constrain the scope of agency that the state can exercise – their conception 
of the state is best encapsulated by Nicos Poulantzas, who posited that “the function of 
the state in a determinate social formation and the interests of the dominant class in this 
formation coincide… by reason of the system itself.”39 Indeed, as Claus Offe reminds us, 
as long as capitalism exists, the people and the government live in fear of “constant threat 
of private capital exercising its power not to invest – whose aggregate exercise… is 
synonymous with economic crisis.”40 In particular, the power of internationally mobile 
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finance capital was already overpowering the control of sovereign governments, as the 
fluid Eurodollar and petrodollar market saw an explosive growth since the late 1960s. 
Despite the strengths of the structuralist-Marxist explanation, however, it in itself 
does not explain the precise political mechanisms in which the relevant political actors 
succumb to the capitalist logic regardless of their ideological affiliations. In a bourgeois-
liberal democracy with universal suffrage, the state is at least formally independent; the 
capitalist constraints are hardly, if ever, based on direct coercions that render the state 
literally unable to enact certain measures and legislations contrary to capitalist interests. 
Capital’s structural, coercive power in capitalism is exercised in the form of economic 
benefits and losses that capitalists are able to inflict because of their exclusive ownership 
of means of production – indeed, the separation of coercive mechanisms in the economic 
base from the legitimatized exercise of violence is the very feature of capitalism that 
distinguishes itself from other modes of production, such as ancient slavery, feudalism 
and authoritarian communism.  
The separation of capital from the instruments of direct, brute force of coercion 
means that the function of capital’s coercive power depends, in the final instance, upon 
the relevant actors’ appraisal of the consequences that capital can inflict upon them when 
they act against capitalist interests. One’s material interests and the perception of her 
interests can be seen as, strictly speaking, always separate; it is one’s perception of 
interests, rather than her “real” interests, that determines her actions.41  Such a voluntarist 
formulation can fall into the bourgeois myth of capitalist-liberal freedom, which trumpets 
the proletariat’s formal, negative freedom to refuse to sell labor power even if its 
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consequence would be starvation and ultimate death. The existence of objective classes, 
based on ownership of means of production, can certainly be postulated, and so can 
objective material interests of each class. Within the confines of capitalist markets, there 
indeed exists a feedback mechanism in which capitalists with insufficint levels of profits 
are unlikely to persist, regardless of the subjective perceptions of capitalists. However, it 
is possible and necessary to scrutinize the nature of consequences that capital can inflict 
upon the state and the economy, choices the political actors have, and what would (or 
was perceived by them to) have been the consequences had they chosen an alternative 
path, without minimizing the structural power inequalities in capitalism that shape and 
constrain these choices. Such a nuanced analysis is crucial in examining the scope of the 
relative autonomy of the state and the exact mechanisms in which capital constrain 
political power, since the evaluation of the capital-induced consequences by political 
actors, especially workers, constitutes an essential aspect of the process of capital’s 
structural power in politics. Furthermore, clear understanding of the ways in which 
capital’s power is mediated and exercised through ideas enables us to envision a potential 
alternative, which is precluded by structural Marxism whose unwitting coincidence with 
neoliberals indicates its shortcomings as a theory of practice. Historical institutionalism 
offers an analytic paradigm which sheds a spotlight upon development and agency in 
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Historical institutionalism is, in its broadest sense, “an attempt to illuminate how 
political struggles are mediated by the institutional setting in which they take place.”42 
Institutions, which encompass “formal contractual agreements, organizational routines 
and conventions [as well as] taken-for-granted normative or cognitive structures,” are 
considered as core explanatory variables that “influence choices, regulate behavior, and 
generally order social interaction.”43 An institutionalist analysis shares some similarities 
with the macro-structural explanations - for example, it considers the capitalist market 
itself as an institution that imposes constraints upon political actions – but it is also 
concerned with the intermediate-level explanations rooted in the institutions that differ 
within the boundaries of capitalism. Historical institutionalism aspires to be a “theoretical 
bridge between men [sic] who make history and the ‘circumstances’ under which they are 
able to do so,” rejecting the extremes of structuralist or voluntarist accounts of politics.44 
Nonetheless, as institutionalism has tended to focus on the ways in which the 
actors’ behaviors are structured by the existing institutions defined as formal structures, 
institutionalism’s explanatory power generally lies in continuity and path dependence 
rather than change. For example, Peter Hall’s notable “Varieties of Capitalism” (VoC) 
thesis posits that a set of complementary and interlocking institutions, such as financial 
systems and structures of industrial relations, creates different types of political 
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economies in different countries that reinforce and reproduce themselves.45 However, 
even though changes in political economy might often happen gradually in advanced 
capitalist countries, dramatic changes have sometimes occurred; the crisis of the Fordist-
Keynesian mode of production in the 1970s throughout the advanced capitalist world 
precipitated an acute political contestation over the mode of production at a fundamental 
level. In particular, the triumph of radical Thatcherite neoliberalism in Britain cannot be 
explained by the mechanisms of path dependence; Hall acknowledged that the shift in 
Britain was an instance of “third order change”, a paradigm shift of rare occurrence. In 
order to better explain change and agency, institutionalist scholars in recent years have 
attempted to broaden their conception of institutions and integrate the analysis of ideas in 
their paradigm. For example, Hall argues that “we also need a more complete account of 
the role ideas play in the policy process”, recognizing that discourses used by 
policymakers are “influential precisely because so much of it is taken for granted and 
unamenable to scrutiny as a whole.”46  
Mark Blyth took a step further to construct a systematic framework to account for 
ideational factors in political economy. Even when the standard structurally-based 
accounts explain destabilization of an existing order, they don’t explain the particular 
form of institutional constellations that succeed it; as he puts it, “structural theories of 
institutional supply are indeterminate as to subsequent institutional form”.47 Criticizing 
the conventional treatment of ideas as a “filler” to explain a gap in structurally-based 
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accounts, he proposes to treat ideas seriously as a causal, transformative factor in its own 
right that shapes institutional change by constituting the actors’ understanding of 
economic crisis, causes and solutions.  Blyth’s key observation is to question the 
conception that interests are more or less structurally derived from institutions, and to 
recognize that perceptions of interests are mediated through ideational factors. 
“Regardless of the structurally given interests one assumes agents to have”, he argues, 
“the large-scale institutional change cannot be understood from class alignments, 
materially given coalitions or other structural prerequisites”.48  
The ideational turn in institutionalism helps it realize its potentials to examine the 
complex interactions between structure and agency, and gives an interpretive framework 
of political action and motivation free from the rational choice theory, in which the actors’ 
goals are assumed to be the “maximization of utility”. Since the rational choice approach 
lacks a solid analysis of how actors come to perceive and identify their interests, its 
practitioners are forced to “deduce preferences from behavior” while claiming that the 
“rational” preferences determine behavior, thus rendering the argument tautological.49 
Ideational institutionalism fills the theoretical lacuna left by the rational choice paradigm, 
by recognizing that preferences and interests cannot be explained without references to 
ideas held by the actors, because “we want what we want because of how we think about 
it.”50 Ideational explanation is not an exclusive one; ideas and institutions influence each 
other. For example, in the British case, fragmentation of unions and its craft origins 
shaped their voluntarism, and the economic and political clout of the City financial 
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interests augmented the moderate ideology of the Labour Party and played a key role in 
the Labour government’s decision to accept the IMF bailout in 1976.  
Many ideational institutionalist scholars have emphasized that causality must be 
attributed to ideas in order to prove their importance. Sheri Berman stipulates that “we 
must not only show that ideas are correlated with political behavior but also be able to 
explain how ideas actually influenced behavior,” which can be demonstrated if “certain 
ideas take on a life of their own, influencing political behavior over an extended period of 
time… separate from the context within which it arose.”51 However, while ideas, 
institutions and interests can analytically be distinguished and analytic rigor is important, 
the relationships between them are not neatly separable in unidirectional causalities. 
Independent causality is deemed by many scholars as sine qua non of influence and 
importance, but the question of whether “ideas affect policy outcomes in ways that are 
truly independent from the effects of interests” are often difficult to answer.52 Indeed, 
ideas cannot be a truly independent factor since they are shaped by material factors 
including institutions and interests, as well as vice versa. Certain aspects of Fordist ideas 
can be attributed more directly to the material interests of those who hold it; for example, 
Labour’s privileging of manufacturing is based on the dominant position of 
manufacturing unions in the labor movement. However, at the same time, ideas like 
productivism and masculinism are more than a simple reflection of the dominant material 
interests, even if they end up reinforcing them. Furthermore, entrenched ideas are often in 
themselves institutions, and interests cannot exist entirely outside of ideas since ideas 
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constitute interests.53 As Blyth argues, not only should we not be forced to “to choose 
between ideas and interests as an ‘all or nothing’ proposition”, we cannot “treat ideas and 
interests as radically different and unrelated concepts” which are mutually exclusive.54 
Instead, the dialectical approach to the interactive dymanic between ideas, interests and 
institutions enables us to gain a richer and contextual understanding of continuity and 
change.  
Many theorists have noted that influential ideas need powerful “carriers” in order 
to achieve political salience, and that ideas exert power only if they are held by influential 
actors or in accordance with powerful interests.55 Indeed, the influence of ideas that are 
adopted and held by those with power can most easily and clearly be identified. For 
example, regarding the shift from Fordism to neoliberalism, Hall, Blyth, Campbell and 
Hay all focus upon the triumphant monetarist ideas. For the British case, Hall argues that 
as stagflation precipitated by structural changes in the economy undermined the 
ideational basis of the Keynesian paradigm, a new space of contestation over economic 
policy paradigms emerged in the media and financial circles.56 As the Keynesian-leaning 
economists lost credibility because its predictions failed to match the empirical reality, 
monetarism gained prestige; influential actors in financial markets and the Conservative 
Party became influenced by, and then adopted, the monetarist ideas because they 
provided “a new rationale for many measures which they had long supported.”57 While 
Hall traces monetarism’s success to political factors, not only to the pure economic logic, 
he also hints at the merit of monetarist arguments and that “many of the ad hoc 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53	  Hay,	  “Ideas	  and	  the	  Construction.”	  
54	  Blyth,	  Great	  Transformations,	  18,	  17.	  
55	  Berman,	  “Ideas,	  Norms,”	  18,	  25,	  and	  Kjær	  and	  Pedersen,	  “Translating	  Liberalization,”	  223.	  
56	  Hall,	  “Policy	  Paradigms,”	  285-­‐286.	  
57	  Ibid.,	  286	  
	   34	  
adjustments towards monetarism made by the 1974-79 Labour government were forced 
on it by the behavior of the financial markets.”58 In contrast, Blyth further pursues the 
constructivist path, focusing on how the inflationary “crisis” itself was constituted in the 
1970s. Not only was monetarism successfully offered as a solution to the “crisis” by 
attributing inflation and unemployment to the state “intervention” in an “otherwise 
naturally self-equilibrating economy,” it changed the perception of the nature of the crisis 
itself; the notion that “inflation is a greater threat to the general welfare than 
unemployment” is decidedly not an objective fact, but a “mediated social fact”.59 Indeed, 
even though inflation rate had steadily been declining since its peak in 1975, the specter 
of inflation had continuously been invoked. Indeed, monetarist-neoliberal ideas needed to 
win the discursive struggles for the inherently political significance of inflation in order 
to present these anti-inflationary and anti-statist policies to be in interests of many actors.  
However, Blyth’s account attributes the change only to the victorious ideas; 
despite his ardent constructivism, Blyth does not analyze in detail the ideational factors 
(or lack thereof) that shaped responses of those actors other than neoliberals, compared to 
his elaborate accounts of neoliberal ideas. In the US case, he does refer to “the ideational 
failure of the Democrats” to come up with “an alternative set of economic ideas to 
recapture the terms of debate” against monetarists.60 He argues that while some 
Democratic intellectuals advocated for industrial policy planning based on 
reindustrialization of the US economy, the plan was predicated upon further loss for 
workers and the Democratic politicians avoided it because it required a “big 
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government.”61 For Sweden, he mentions the political failure of the wage-earner fund and 
the Social Democrats’ acceptance of the basic neoliberal tenets for austerity, smaller 
government and increased private profits in the 1981 “crisis report”.62 However, the 
reasons and mechanisms in which the parties of New Deal and Social Democracy failed 
to embrace and pursue a non-neoliberal alternative are not deeply examined.  
It is not particularly surprising that capitalists and their political representatives 
favor ideas that promote their material interests in exploitation, and that they have grossly 
unequal resources to propagate their ideas through the mass media and research institutes. 
The successful discursive domination of these neoliberal ideas was to a large extent due 
to the vast resources that only the organized business could mobilize, hence making the 
explanation more materialist and less ideational. In order to explain the political and 
ideational victory of the Right, the ideational landscape of the actors other than the 
neoliberal advocates must also be understood. We need to account for the decline of the 
old ideas and political failure of alternative ideas, in addition to the rise of new ideologies, 
in order to depict a better account of the regime change in advanced capitalist political 
economies. In the context of the rise of neoliberalism in Britain, the Labour Party and the 
trade unions were crucial institutions that constituted the linchpin of the Fordist-
Keynesian regime and possessed the power, organization and resources to develop 
alternatives. The Labour leadership, including Callaghan and Chancellor Denis Healey, 
chose the non-Left path; even though they were not full-fledged neoliberal Blairites, it 
would be far from plausible to argue that the Wilson-Callaghan government even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61	  Ibid.,	  191-­‐193.	  
62	  Ibid.,	  205,	  220.	  
	   36	  
attempted, let alone struggled till the end, a solution that challenges the capital’s power. 63 
As we will see below, Callaghan and Healey were willing morticians of Keynesianism – 
because Labour’s course of action was more than “a more or less functional response to 
exogenous shocks,” the political-ideational explanation is required to explain their 
willingness.64 Those who kept the Keynesian-Croslandite belief in the compatibity of 
social justice with capital-friendly policies failed to quickly realize that radical measures 
were necessary to counter the Callaghan-Healey line, while both Benn and Healey 
understood that “there really [wasn’t] a middle ground because Keynesianism with its 
inflationary remedies has failed.” 65 Therefore, the ideational factors that induced most 
Labourites to choose certain political and policy paths, among many potentialities 
underdetermined by economic-structural factors, played a crucial role in the 
neoliberalism’s victory.  
The influence of ideas on political economy is not limited to that of the ideas that 
directly undergird the ascendant paradigm. The notion of “ideas” encompasses multiple 
levels of concepts, from comprehensive world views to particular policy programmes. 
Relatively specific, micro-level ideas require channeling through policy-making elites, 
and since the spread of ideas held by powerful actors can easily and more undisputably 
be traced, its causality is easier to identify. However, economic ideas are not only 
“effective weapons” for actors to transform institutions. The ideas, especially macro-level 
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ideas that are dominant in the entire society, can also function in different ways than 
simply providing the blueprints for a dominant regime of political economy. They also 
create normative or cognitive constraints on political actors and policy outcomes. Such 
operations of hegemonic ideas in a Gramscian sense are often hidden as assumptions or 
“common sense,” precluding the emergence of ideas outside of the dominant framework; 
more natural the “idea” seems, more powerful it is. 
My contention is that the Fordist ideational features – productivism and 
masculinism – shaped the political choices that the British trade unions and the Labour 
Party made in the 1970s, in which the logic of ideational path dependence was at work. 
Since masculinism and productivism are the fundamental ideational core of Fordism, it is 
a clear case in which “the very ideas on which institutions are predicated and which 
inform their design and development… exert constraints on political autonomy”.66 These 
ideas, formed in the heyday of Fordism, persisted to the different context in which the 
system was crumbling. Ideational path dependent effects made difficult the other possible 
policy paths they could have taken. In that sense, ideational factors can be used to explain 
continuity as well as change – or in this case, continuity of the (center-)left which led to 
the change in the overall system. The influence of the Fordist ideas on the Labour Party 
and the unions as their “carriers” matters because these actors were indeed powerful – 
though not as powerful as capital, but nonetheless the primary oppositional forces. Indeed, 
Fordist ideas held by political actors play a role in explaining why, as Harvey notes (in 
support of his structuralist arguments), “as soon as the political choices were seen as a 
trade-off between growth or equity, there was no question which way the wind would 
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blow for even the most dedicated of reformist governments.”67 Their dependence on the 
Fordist ideas also needs to be situated in the context of the ideas’ hegemony in the entire 
society; as an electoral mass party, the party’s ideational path was also constrained by the 
hegemonic values among the voters.  
 
Fordist Values and Labourism 
 Fordism was an “intensive” form of accumulation, achieved through increased 
capital investment and productivity rather than conquering of new markets. Growth 
through increased internal consumption is necessary in a regime of intensive 
accumulation; capital accumulation requires continued rise in production and 
consumption of consumer goods.68 Fordism’s structural compromise with the workers in 
terms of wage increases is integral to the Fordist regime of accumulation, since the 
growth of the wage-earners’ purchasing power is required to stimulate demand, 
consumption and realization of surplus value.69 Indeed, it is an imperative for capitalists 
to create material needs and consumerist values among workers and citizens as 
consumers, lest they cease to associate more consumption with well-being and stop 
increasing the levels of consumption. The exponential rise of the advertising industry, 
promoting conspicuous consumption through the creation of “sign value,” has reflected 
and reinforced the cultural conditions of acquisitive consumerism as a hegemonic 
value.While this mechanism has made possible the tremendous rise in the workers’ 
standard of living, it has accompanied the rise of the idea that identifies workers’ interests 
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primarily, if not solely, with the increased levels of consumption. The spirit of 
“possessive individualism” has been a spirit of capitalism since its inception, but as the 
Fordist regime closely integrated the workers into the hegemonic system through their 
“institutionalised share of productivity gains,” capitalism also ideationally integrated and 
co-opted the workers.70 Increase in consumptive capacity of the mass of workers served 
dual purposes for capitalism, as an economic requirement for capital accumulation and a 
principal mechanism of legitimation. As Hilary Wainwright describes the British 
“Labourism,” its “complaint against capitalism is that labor receives little of the wealth it 
creates,” rather than degradation of working conditions, lack of freedom in work, or any 
fundamental critique of capitalism.71 Offe notes that labor itself ceased to be seen as 
unfreedom, as “money has gained a worldwide victory over time” and society developed 
in atomizing ways that prevent fulfillment of life through free time except with financial 
resources.72 The productivist-consumerist values have strong affinity with retreat from 
socialism, especially in the period of rapid growth; why should capitalism be denounced 
when it is dutifully delivering the “goods” that matter?73 
Another facet of the Fordist ideas concerns the identity of workers and boundaries 
of the labor movements’ interests. As the Fordist regime was predicated upon the 
gendered division of male breadwinner workers and their wives performing unpaid 
domestic labor for reproduction of labor power, the category of the “worker” was 
associated with the male worker, as the labor movement had “been swept off its feet by 
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the magic of masculinity, muscle and machinery”.74 In the “Labourist” discourses the 
workers’ interests were represented and constructed as male breadwinners’ interests, and 
the working-class solidarity was often framed as brotherly bonds.75 The influence and 
normalization of masculinist and anti-socialist value of Fordism in working-class politics 
is demonstrated in the comment of an outspoken right-wing Labourite John Golding, who 
quipped “I’m a class politician. I’d prefer to have a straightforward Labour Party, without 
these trendy socialists, always bringing up women.”76 Women’s lower rate of 
unionization, gendered power inequality with unions and the discourses of the culture of 
“workingmen” associated with populist masculinity reinforced each other, leading to 
exclusion of part-time workers’ interests and the damage to more solidaristic collective 
bargaining.  
 The rich analyses of Labourism specific to British Labour confirm and elaborate 
the Fordist values in the British context. The British Labour Party’s historical, distinctive 
reformism since its foundation is well-noted, but it was the New Left thinkers such as 
Ralph Miliband and Tom Nairn who articulated the thesis on Labourism, reflecting the 
postwar condition. A few months before Harold Wilson’s first electoral victory in 1964, 
Nairn argued that Labour’s incorrigible ideational tendencies towards Fabian 
evolutionary reformism, underpinned by conservatism of the dominant trade unions and 
the weakness of the Labour Left in both theoretical and organizational sense, were 
obstructing the path towards socialism through the Labour Party. Nairn’s scathing 
critique of Labourism is also an argument for ideational path dependence for the party; he 
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argues that Labour’s “fourth-rate socialist traditions” originated in, and had not been able 
to cleanse itself of, “worthless philistinism of the pious Victorian petty bourgeois.” 77  
The early Labour leaders’ “servile imitation of the ruling class’s corpus of ideas” had 
survived for a few generations as the dominant ideological force within the party.78 
Indeed, Labourism as a political culture was particularly congruent with Fordism, and 
Labour’s ideological mapping by the early New Left is largely applicable for the analyses 
of the events of the 1970s; Callaghan and Healey were ideational heirs to Macdonald and 
Gaitskell. 
While there are ideational backgrounds specific to British Labourism, 
productivism and masculinism were commonly shared in European social democratic 
parties of the postwar era. In terms of ideological heritage, the German Social Democrats 
could not be more different from the British Labour Party; the German SPD stated as a 
pre-eminent mass Marxist party in the world and influenced other continental social 
democratic parties, while the Labour Party was reformist since its foundation. However, 
continental social democratic parties renounced Marxism after the war, such as in the Bad 
Godesberg Program of the German SPD in 1959; reformist social democracy, not so 
unlike British Labourism, dominated Western European working-class politics except in 
France and Italy that had a stronger Communist presence. Analysis of Labourism cannot 
directly be applied in the case of other social democratic parties, but could serve as one 
prototype in which the working-class leftist politics failed to create an emancipatory post-
Fordist alternative.	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 The critical New Left analysis of Labourism was connected to critical practices to 
transcend Labourism, and a sense of optimism pervaded when it began in the early 
sixties; Miliband concluded that “as the Labour Party’s impulse, Labourism has now all 
but spent itself. But the battle for socialism has barely begun” in the very first issue of 
New Left Review in 1960.79 Nairn was also cautiously optimistic on the prospect of 
potential changes to the Labourist ideology, in the midst of Wilson-mania in 1964. While 
acknowledging Wilson’s technocratism, he believed that the party leadership would be 
“much more open to left-wing ideas and pressures than his predecessors” if trade unions 
would grow into a leftist influence based on the stronger and more militant working-class 
consciousness.80 While the Labour Left noticeably grew stronger since the late sixties 
along the lines of radicalization of trade unionism that Nairn and Miliband had 
envisioned, it was simply not strong enough to overcome the undemocratic party 
structure – another legacy of Labourism – to win the “battle for socialism” within Labour. 	  
Productivism and masculinism were part of “Labourism”, along with moderatism 
based on the Labour Right’s dominance, in a sense that these ideologies constituted the 
party’s long-standing ideational heritage. The major consequence of the institutionalized 
entrenchment of the Fordist-Labourist values in the mainstream British labor was the lack 
of integration between their class politics and the emancipatory politics of the New Social 
Movements –feminism and ecology- that emerged and flourished in the late Fordist era to 
advocate for alternative visions by radically questioning hegemonic values. Labour failed 
to establish what Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe called “the logic of equivalence” 
with themselves and the New Left. An equivalence is a combination of positions in 
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different antagonisms woven into one coherent ideology, upon which collective political 
identities and agendas are constructed; political, ideological contestations over different 
equivalences are crucial, because every struggle can take on multiple meanings or 
formulations and hence starkly different equivalences can be established.81  
The New Left critique of capitalism was based upon yearning for autonomy and 
freedom in a broad sense, whether it be freedom from patriarchal constrictions or 
Taylorist factory regimes. As masculinist labor was reluctant to fully absorb these 
emancipatory agendas, the struggles for autonomy were co-opted by the capitalists of the 
neoliberal Right. Labour and their established allies did attempt to make a common cause 
with the emancipatory movements, and they had certainly made progress in regards to 
feminism and qualitative labor struggles. However, the relationships between Labour and 
the New Left had always remained an unstable coalitional politics, in which antagonisms 
between them were as visible as commonalities and solidarities.82 As the Fordist-
Labourist values locked society into the valorization of possessiveness, the rise of 
emancipatory individualism was absorbed into “the matrix of possessive individualism,” 
without overcoming of which the politics of liberation, cries of autonomy and freedom 
from the system would simply degenerate into petit-bourgeois liberalism.83 In contrast 
with Labour, the new Right successfully translated “a series of democratic resistances to 
the transformation of social relations” into neoliberal discourses of “resistances to the 
bureaucratic character of the new forms of state organization,” which have absorbed the 
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support of skilled manual workers due to their masculinist economic individualism.84 Luc 
Boltanski and Eve Chiapello identify the mechanisms of capitalism’s evolution through 
periods of crisis as co-opting of the elements of critique and their modification into a 
capitalist form.85 The post-Fordist “new spirit of capitalism” absorbed the values of 
autonomy – including feminist criticism of family wage and welfare-state paternalism - 
which were savvily co-opted as an integral part of the neoliberal settlement.86As Laclau 
and Mouffe postulate, a logic of equivalence is “always hegemonic insofar as it does not 
simply establish an ‘alliance’ between given interests, but modifies the very identity of 
the forces engaging in that alliance.”87 The neoliberal discourses attained the position of 
hegemony, as they reformulated people’s political identity or at least their conception of 
their interests; freedom came to mean freedom to consume and narrow negative liberty 
from the state, rather than freedom from capitalist constraints and freedom of self-
actualization.  
Laclau and Mouffe emphasize the importance of having a strategy of construction 
of a new order in establishing hegemony. “If the demands of a subordinated group are 
presented purely as negative demands… without being linked to any viable project for 
the reconstruction of specific areas of society, their capacity to act hegemonically will be 
excluded from the outset,” they argue; the British productivist labor could not establish a 
hegemony since they were bereft of new ideas in the times when the golden years of 
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growth were ending.88 The seventies saw a situation where “workers’ trade union power 
had gone as far as it could in terms of the redistribution of profits; but Labourism, being a 
political reflection of this power, could not take it any further.”89 An observation of 
Frances Morrell, Tony Benn’s senior advisor, is very telling as an indication of the lost 
possibilities; “for a brief moment [in 1974 after the success of the miners’ strike], the 
establishment was crushed… we could have carried our most radical policies through, 
with the political will and trade-union support.” 90 Labourism was the cause of the failure 
to create distributional coalitions willing to share and fight for the consensus of the social 
wage. Envisioning an alternative mode of production after Fordism would have required 
a radical re-examination of purposes of political economy, which most of Labour Party 
members – and even many socialists - did not imagine. As integral aspects of Labourism, 
productivism and masculinism functioned in concert with moderatism – the original 
meaning of Labourism – and predisposed the party towards proto-neoliberalism, the 
natural path for any party without clear leftist commitments.  
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Chapter 3: Welfare State and the Social Wage 
 
“The dying welfare state brought its own Newspeak: government’s failure to link 
child benefit, unemployment pay and so on to the cost of living was the fight against 
inflation… and a new political movement that saw remedies to the whole predicament, if 
only the nation’s women would buckle down to their traditional role and biological 
destiny, was known quite simply as FAMILY.” – Zoë Fairbairns, Benefits (1979) 
 
Origins of the Welfare State Retrenchment 
The crisis of Fordism exposed the contradictions of the welfare state in advanced 
capitalist societies. The post-1945 era of organized capitalism saw a dramatic expansion 
of the welfare state. The continual rapid growth in the Fordist years enabled a 
compromise between social expenditure and capitalist profits by satisfying both, which 
was rendered impossible as the economy stagnated - the welfare state faced a fiscal crisis, 
which could only be resolved either through the increase in revenue through taxation or 
reduction in social policy expenditure. Both sides of the class-political struggle gained 
strength as the crisis deepened. The moderate establishment grew stale and hollow, as the 
tension between the dual characters of the welfare state came to the surface. The Left 
became resurgent, as workers were empowered by the full employment, wage gains, and 
access to health care and education, for all of which the welfare state played an 
indispensable role. Fordist rigidity and conformism spurred the dramatic, global surge of 
New Left social movements. On the other hand, the crisis of Fordism also gave rise to the 
laissez-faire ideologies of the New Right in the 1970s, who blamed the economic crisis to 
the gains made by the working-class. Reflecting its contradictory character vis-à-vis 
capitalism, the welfare state became the focus of the grand contestations of the 1970s, 
along with the interrelated struggles between labor and capital.  
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The subsequent retrenchment of the welfare state is a reflection and an integral 
part of the rise of the Right in the post-Fordist period. It should be noted that the reality 
of the reductions in social policy commitments since the 1980s is more ambiguous than 
the triumphant rhetoric of neoliberalism suggests, as Paul Pierson demonstrated.91 As the 
welfare state institutions from the Fordist-Keynesian era created large groups of 
beneficiaries of the established social policies, the political cost of drastic destruction or 
outright abolition of the welfare state has become too prohibitive to the legitimacy of the 
ruling parties or the state. Nonetheless, regardless of the extent of its shrinkage and the 
path dependence effects that many social policies institutionally enjoy, the dominance of 
the rhetoric of retrenchment is a testament to the hegemonic victory of the Right against 
the Left since the decline of Fordism. The Rightist conception of the welfare state as an 
extraneous burden to the economy had become “common sense”, while the Leftist vision 
of the welfare state as a tool of liberation from capitalism has been relegated to the fringe.          
After the tumultuous late-Fordist years of contestation, the capitalist logic of the welfare 
state largely prevailed over the liberatory visions through the welfare state. 
 Considering the centrality of the welfare state in advanced capitalist political 
economy, the trajectory of social policy commitments in the late Fordist period illustrates 
a mechanism behind the loss of post-Fordist visions alternative to neoliberalism. In 
Britain, while the scope of retrenchment initiated by the Labour Government of 1974-79 
was hardly comparable to the Thatcherite ambitions and assaults, they largely accepted 
the vision of the welfare state whose primary purpose was to serve the capitalist needs 
rather than to liberate people. The conception of the welfare as a burden rather than an 
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aim in itself presaged Thatcherism. By obviating the alternative visions at a pivotal 
moment in history, Labour paved the welfare state’s long descending path, which, as of 
now, has not yet been halted. The analysis of politics in the years of paradigm shift in 
modes of production reveals the mechanisms behind the world-historical defeat of social 
democracy since the 1970s. 
 
Gendered Reproduction of Labor Power and the Contradictions of the Welfare 
State 
The welfare state is an essentially contradictory phenomenon, because it 
simultaneously serves and undermines capitalism – as Claus Offe puts it, “while 
capitalism cannot coexist with, neither can it exist without, the welfare state.”92 The self-
regulating market cannot sustain itself, as there is bound to be a significant proportion of 
the population who cannot support themselves through the labor market; Polanyi 
observed that “leaving the fate of … people to the market would be tantamount to 
annihilating them.”93 The collapse of a functional social formation and the failure of 
reproduction of labor power would render the market economy itself inoperable over time. 
As Polanyi documented, the purest laissez-faire at the earliest stage of industrialization in 
the mid-nineteenth century was promptly remedied by rudimentary social policies, which 
were instituted by bourgeois governments of different ideological stripes throughout 
Western Europe.94 The limitation of working hours, basic social insurance, old-age 
pension and other ameliorative measures served to buttress legitimacy of the capitalist 
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system and to protect labor power from over-exploitation and destruction by short-
sighted capital.  
As the capitalist economy grew complex, the welfare state, “as the use of state 
power to modify the reproduction of labour power and to maintain the non-working 
population,” became more significant.95 The capacity of women and men to perform 
labor is produced through market consumption with wages and domestically-produced 
services (housework); the state contributes to facilitate its continual reproduction through 
income transfer (benefits and social security systems), and service provisions or 
subsidies.96 Certain social policies have become indispensable for reproduction of 
productive labor power in a modern economy; as Offe puts it, “in the absence of large-
scale state-subsidized housing, public education and health services, as well as extensive 
compulsory social security schemes, the working of an industrial economy would simply 
be inconceivable.”97 Childcare and education are particularly pertinent, due to their 
indispensable functions in inter-generational reproduction of labor power. Income 
transfer and service provisions are also utilized to maintain livelihood of those who 
cannot be employed, as their insecurity is exacerbated by the complete 
proletarianization.98 While theoretically distinct, the two major functions of the welfare 
state cannot be sharply differentiated, since the large portion of the current non-working 
population (such as the unemployed and children) provide labor power in the future.99  
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Despite its instrumental utility for capitalism, the welfare state undermines the 
basis of capitalist rule at the same time. As Esping-Andersen posits, the expansion of the 
welfare state has a de-commodifying tendency; de-commodification of labor power 
occurs “when a service is rendered as a matter of right, and when a person can maintain a 
livelihood without reliance on the market.”100 Reproduction of labor power through the 
state, as opposed to the market or the family, de-commodifies numerous economic 
activities related to reproduction. The logical conclusion of the idea of the welfare state is 
the recognition of the social rights to economic security based on citizenship (or status as 
a human being). Such rights ensure that capacities to labor are sustainably renewed, but at 
the same time removes the principal mechanism that enables exploitation of workers and 
capitalist accumulation itself - implicit coercion based on the threat of starvation. As the 
de-commodifying welfare state destabilizes the structurally coercive capitalist class 
relations, labor can organize to gain substantial power against capital. As such, the high 
levels of de-commodification have been difficult to achieve in capitalist societies, and 
universalistic provisions of social services and income transfers have only been won after 
protracted struggles by the working-class forces and the Left parties. Non-capitalist 
“relatively autonomous subsystems of life oriented to the production and distribution of 
use-values” that is not guided by market rationality have taken hold in certain sectors in 
certain countries, constituting a crowning achievement of social democracy.101 
Capital always has an interest in the extension of proletarianization, functioning 
as a tendency to promote labor force participation for women. However, the imperatives 
of capital accumulation also require constant reproduction of labor power. Since 
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reproducing labor power through the universalist, de-commodifying welfare state is 
antagonistic to capitalist accumulation, non-public processes of reproduction of labor 
power are preferable and necessary for the interests of capital. Capitalist interests are 
somewhat contradictory, since capitalist development itself destroyed the pre-capitalist 
forms of economic collectivities such as extended family as a unit of production and risk-
sharing, necessitating the Polanyian double movement. Beyond the liberal-minimalist 
welfare state, however, fixing the failure of self-regulating market through private 
families is more conducive to capitalist exploitation, by precluding the rise of the de-
commodifying welfare state as an alternative means to reproduce labor power and 
maintain the non-working population. Hence, Esping-Andersen illuminates that “the 
liberal dogma is forced to seek recourse in pre-capitalist formations of social aid, such as 
the family.”102 Indeed, the minimalist welfare state implies that most of the care-related 
work is performed within the private sphere - predominantly in the family, since only a 
small number of workers can afford comprehensive welfare services through the market 
without radical redistribution. The hegemonic gender system dictates that it is 
overwhelmingly performed by women in the family.  
A distinguishing aspect of domestic care labor based on family ties is the lack of 
remuneration for the laborer, even though it is indispensable for capitalist accumulation. 
Because the commodities that can be purchased in the market with the wage are not 
consumable in themselves without additional labor that processes them into a form that 
can regenerate labor power, unpaid domestic laborers partly subsidize the cost of 
reproduction of labor power that capitalists exploit, hence enabling capital to increase the 
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rate of exploitation.103 As Jean Gardiner puts it, “the contribution which domestic labour 
makes to surplus value is one of keeping down necessary labour to a level that is lower 
than the actual subsistence level of the working class… it is cheaper for capital to pay a 
male worker a wage sufficient to maintain, at least partially, a wife who prepares meals 
for him, than to pay him a wage on which he could afford to eat regularly at 
restaurants.”104  
However, the reliance on uncommodified domestic labor performed 
overwhelmingly by women is not necessarily accompanied by the increased rate of 
exploitation by capital. The wages for male breadwinner workers with housewives cannot 
be as low as that of subsistence level for single-person households, even though the 
capitalists could avoid paying the full costs of labor power. In the most despotic form of 
capitalism where all proletarian men, women and children work long hours for wages, 
few workers are paid enough to enable their family members to perform unpaid labor 
within households. Indeed, the domestic work was haphazardly commercialized to a large 
degree in the early-nineteenth century Britain, inadequately performed for meagre 
wages.105  
In contrast, in the Fordist “family wage” model, capitalists pay the larger portion 
of the cost to reproduce the labor power of their (male) workers as a compromise in the 
class struggle against sufficiently-organized labor. While the proletariat as a class gains 
in the family wage system, the benefits are accrued in a gendered manner, since the wage 
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for the entire family is paid to the male worker. Women in unpaid domestic work are 
dependent on their wage-earning husbands for their livelihood, and therefore the husband 
“is the bourgeois, the woman represents the proletariat,” as Engels wrote of the male-
breadwinner family.106 The decisively unequal power relationship in the distributional 
struggles within the households would most likely result in disproportionate benefits (in 
forms of consumption, free time or decision-making power within the household) for 
proletarian men than women. Even though the basis of intra-household power 
relationship has material aspects, the mechanisms of the domestic mode of production are 
also rooted in socially-constructed discursive and ideological system of gender, which in 
itself is distinct from, and arguably predates, capitalism.107  
The Fordist male breadwinner model of welfare was facilitated by the postwar 
welfare states through a number of measures, whose ideal is encapsulated in William 
Beveridge’s claim that the “ideal [social] unit is the household of man, wife and children 
maintained by the earnings of the first alone.”108 The patriarchal welfare state was 
politically constructed through social policies, such as the notorious “cohabitation rule” 
which explicitly prohibited women who were sharing a household with a man (whether 
married or not) from claiming unemployment and sickness benefits, and treatment of a 
married couple as a taxable unit which lowered the income tax rate for the male 
breadwinner. The contributory National Insurance system was based on employment, 
hence many unpaid working women were classified as “dependents” with inferior 
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benefits; the very inequality in labor market participation perpetuated by the social 
policies led to gendered bifurcation into employment-based, male-dominant National 
Insurance and means-tested, meagre, stigmatized and feminized Income Support. The 
severe lack of public child care provision, which had a paltry capacity of 26,000 in 1974 
after three decades of welfare state expansion, exacerbated the gendered segmentation of 
labor market.109 
The alternative to the male breadwinner model is the system in which the cost of 
reproduction of labor power is borne by the state, rather than by those who perform 
unremunerated care labor. The ways in which the state pays for them include income 
transfer to domestic laborers and direct provision of services. The limited forms of 
income transfer exist in many highly-developed welfare states, especially as an allowance 
for child care; in Britain, universal Family Allowances represents one of the cornerstones 
of the postwar British welfare state. Family Allowances are directly paid to mothers, 
enabling them to have an independent source of income, however meagre. In the 
planning of the Family Allowances implemented in 1945, feminist politician Eleanor 
Rathbone successfully argued for the payments to women for the sake of financially 
empowering them within households.110 Yet, its implications for gender politics are 
highly ambivalent, since the program is based on maternalistic ideas and assumptions 
which could perpetuate the inequality in housework and lack of women’s empowerment 
through labor market participation. The “wages for housework” platform adopted by the 
feminist movements in the ‘70s is a more radical claim along the same lines with similar, 
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more exacerbated dilemmas. While it could be argued that that state-centric welfare 
system is nothing but replacement of “private patriarchy with public patriarchy,”111 the 
crucial difference between them is the public provisions are based on recognition of 
social rights rather than the husband’s benevolence and can be claimed through collective 
political struggles.112  
In contrast with cash provisions, service provision by the state is far more clearly 
emancipatory as it lessens the burden of unpaid care labor, facilitates women’s 
employment on equal conditions outside the households, and ensures that the welfare 
production is paid for by the public at the same time.113 Furthermore, the expansion of the 
public sector in social services has provided a crucial source of employment opportunities 
for women.114 As such, there is a structural affinity between de-commodification and de-
familiarization; de-familiarization requires de-commodification of welfare. Despite the 
ostensible claims of liberals that market provision of welfare also leads to de-
familiarization, the liberal-minimalist welfare states are in fact as familiarist as the 
conservative welfare regime, since welfare provided through the market only represents 
de-familiarization for the rich (unless it involves adequate levels of state subsidies, which 
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defeat the liberal principle).115 It is not coincidence that the social democratic, 
universalist welfare state model represents the most advanced form in both aspects.  
  
Welfare Production, Productivity and Capitalism 
Capitalist markets cannot produce adequate welfare activities and reproduce 
functioning society and the market economy on its own without interventions by the 
extra-market institutions such as the family or the state. However, even though capitalism 
needs extra-market production of welfare, it does not recognize welfare activities as a 
part of capital accumulation. Welfare production, either through the state or the family, 
does not yield profits for the capitalist sector; the state services only produce use value, 
and not surplus value. The welfare state expenditure (whether it be through service 
provision or income transfer) does increase the aggregate demand and output in the 
economy, but only if it results in expansionary fiscal policy (i.e. taxes do not rise as much 
as the expenditure).116 The constant production of surplus value and its re-investment is a 
precondition for capitalist economic growth, which is hindered by higher public 
expenditure and revenue - even though non-market welfare production is necessary for 
capital accumulation to a certain extent, the universalistic welfare state is more expansive 
than the minimally necessary level of welfare activities. Since the highly-developed 
welfare state can hinder accumulation of profits and economic growth, the welfare state is 
seen as superfluous luxury which is “unaffordable” and whose retrenchment is 
objectively necessary in the times of economic crisis and/or slow growth. The dominant 
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perception of the welfare state spending as “unproductive” has dual origins – capitalist-
structural and ideational.  
The “necessity” to reduce the scope of social policy is, to a certain extent, rooted 
in the structure of capitalism and can only be overcome through the limiting or abolishing 
capitalism. An economic condition that is hostile to capital accumulation (or rather, 
capital’s perception as such, manifested in “business confidence”) would lead to capital 
flight or an investment strike. As Offe notes, capital’s power to obstruct democratic 
politics, including extensive social policies, is based upon their institutional capability to 
inflict the “ultimate political sanction [which] is non-investment or the threat of it,” 
aggregate exercise of which is economic crisis and depletion of revenue for the welfare 
state.117 As long as the vast majority of productive resources are owned by the capitalist 
sector and “investment decisions obey the rule of maximum expected productivity,”the 
Keynesian welfare state is self-limiting and “must ‘positively subordinate’ itself to the 
capitalist economy.”118 Therefore, overcoming such anti-democratic constraints upon the 
welfare state requires “the logic of vetoing capital’s use of veto power which forecloses 
exactly that one option upon which the class power of capital resides: the option not to 
invest and thereby to withdraw society’s resources from societal use”, through the capital 
and exchange control to prevent capital flight combined with the shift towards public 
ownership of productive resources substantial enough to withstand capital’s investment 
strike, as envisioned in the Swedish wage-earner fund model.119  
 Productivist ideologies and assumptions facilitate welfare state retrenchment, and 
constitute an integral aspect of the politics whose only vision after the Fordist “golden 
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years” has become, unwittingly or not, de facto neoliberalism. Productivism directs the 
government towards the policy paths that require maximum capital investment even at 
the expense of social policy aspirations, subordinating democratic politics to the capitalist 
power. Holding maximum production for the sake of maximum consumption to be a 
definition of good life is distinct from aiming for the minimal level of productivity 
necessary to attain other socially desirable ends, such as the universalist welfare state 
with secure social services and maximum freedom from wage labor (shorter working 
hours). Left-productivist politics regards higher growth rate as an essential precondition 
for redistributive policies, and it has been a cornerstone of social democratic politics at 
least since Bernstein; however, there is no a priori reason for Left politics to privilege 
private consumption of goods and services over other liberatory goals.  
In terms of concrete policies, non-productivist politics would imply increased 
levels of taxation to finance public welfare services as well as robust, de-commodifying 
guarantee of income security, as outlined in the earlier chapter. 120 Redistributive 
principles would indicate the preference for tax increase in a heavily progressive, 
graduated manner, with an emphasis on taxation upon corporate profits and capital gains. 
However, in addition to redistribution, the tax-financed expansion of the welfare state 
would entail the greater levels of production and consumption of welfare services (and 
consequent freedom), at the expense of forgone private consumption. As the welfare state 
expands to a social democratic level, the burden of taxation for the so-called “middle 
class” could proportionally rise, creating a condition in which a political coalition for the 
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further social policy expandion is rendered difficult. Whether this outcome is desirable or 
not is inherently a normative and political question, contrary to the oft-made arguments 
for retrenchment as the only objectively viable option.121 The tax increases would not 
represent an objective decline in the standard of living, when it would accompany the rise 
in the social wage.  
The anti-welfare state ideology privileges private consumption over the realm of 
freedom as free time in the distributional conflicts. The potential increase in private 
consumption that follows lower income tax rate would disproportionately benefit men 
due to the gendered disparities in employment and income. Furthermore, productivist 
goals are accomplished with longer working-hours for unpaid welfare providers, most of 
whom are women. As Anna Coote and Beatrix Campbell argue, the burden of welfare 
production would be shifted from the tax-paying public to the unpaid carers, rather than 
simply disappear; “when it ceases to be convenient to spend money on public services, 
responsibility is handed back to those two euphemisms for unpaid female labour, ‘the 
community’ and ‘the family’.”122  
There is an iron triangle among productivism, masculinism and capitalism in 
which each facilitates the other two. Productivism is a cultural condition of capitalism 
that affirms and legitimizes its fundamental law of motion that never ceases to exhort 
“accumulate, accumulate!” by prioritizing what capitalism deems as productive; 
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capitalism structurally functions to realize productivist goals.123 Masculinism aids 
capitalism and productivism by providing an ideology that glorifies the system of 
reproduction of labor power and socially-necessary care labor that incurs the cheapest 
cost and least threat to capital (women’s unpaid labor in families), and capitalism 
buttresses masculinism by preventing the rise of de-familiarizing welfare state.124 
Productivism is connected to masculinism, not only in a discursive, cultural sense 
suggested by quasi-essentialist versions of ecofeminism; productivism serves to lengthen 
women’s working hours and disregards the politics of working time, and masculinism 
devalues the economic activities considered unproductive by productivists.  
These connections between productivism, masculinism and capitalism illuminate 
the ideational path dependence at the crisis of Fordism, in addition to the institutional 
path dependence; the persistence of Fordist ideas on the Left obscured the emancipatory 
post-Fordist visions of political economy. 125  From a purely class perspective, the male 
breadwinner model of welfare production is not necessarily inferior for workers 
compared to extensive public welfare provision. However, ideational aspects of Fordism 
induced the interpretation of the welfare state expenditure as a burden to the economy, an 
obstacle to the priorities such as capital accumulation and lower tax rate, and replaceable 
due to the expectation of unpaid, private welfare provisions. The failure to normatively 
assert and prioritize the liberatory aspects of the welfare state at the crisis of Fordism, 
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especially by the historic champions of the welfare state on the center-left, enabled the 
neoliberal discourse of retrenchment to be presented as the only alternative. 
Even considering capital’s structural power to withdraw investment and halt 
production, masculinism and productivism were pivotal in facilitating Labour’s often 
reluctant acquiescence to the capitalist imperatives. Furthermore, in so far as the 
beginning of retrenchment was conditioned by the constraints of capitalism itself and the 
alternative course of action would have required a shift to socialism, productivism and 
masculinism also thwarted the possibility of politics to transcend capitalism. Adam 
Przeworski explains the institutional reproduction of capitalism with the “valley of 
transition thesis”, which disputes the workers’ propensity to rally for socialism due to the 
short-term damage to the material interests of workers in the course of an attempt to 
realize socialism.126 A certain level of disinvestment and capital flight is inevitable in a 
transition to socialism, however swift the political action is.127 Therefore, even if the 
long-term material interests of the workers in socialism are (perceived to be) superior to 
that of capitalism, it would be “irrational” for workers and their political representatives 
to embark on a socialist project which results in immediate decline of their consumption 
levels, which is especially acute in the times of capitalist crisis, rather than minimize the 
damage through class compromise. Since Przeworski assumes workers to be “rational 
actors” and he explicitly assumes “improving the material welfare” to be the workers’ 
sole aim,128 his analysis posits a pessimistic conclusion regarding the socialist potential in 
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advanced capitalism. However, what he also demonstrates is the importance of the 
productivist ideas and aims, which close off the path to socialism and leave acquiescence 
to the capitalist imperative (proto-neoliberalism in the 1970s) as the only palatable 
political option.  
 In the sections below, I examine and demonstrate the Fordist ideational path 
dependence in the case of the British Labour Party. Productivism and masculinism 
reigned as dominant values in the Labour Party, whose Attlee government established a 
comprehensive and often universalistic, yet Fordist-patriarchal, welfare state in the 
immediate postwar years. The Labour Party was in government in the crucial years of 
1974-79, in which the foundations of the Fordist-Keynesian settlement crumbled down; 
the governments of Harold Wilson and James Callaghan took a reluctant, small yet 
unmistakable step towards neoliberalism. The British case is not necessarily 
representative of all forms of Fordism, productivism or masculinism in Western advanced 
capitalist societies; the validity of the general theory on Fordist ideational path 
dependence in the rise of neoliberalism as dominant post-Fordism needs to be further 
examined comparatively.129 In particular, the unique acuteness of the economic crisis in 
Britain, as evidenced in the emergency IMF loan with austerity directives, does lend 
stronger credence to an argument based on capitalist-structural constraints.130 However, 
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through an examination of the historical development of ideas in a particular society and 
party, the empirical foundations of the ideational path dependence can be elucidated. 
 
Productivism in the Labour Party 
 Productivism,  the idea that espouses the primacy of economic growth as the 
fundamental basis and prerequisite for improving workers’ lives, has always been central 
to the philosophy and the spirit of social democracy and modern trade union movements, 
and particularly so in the British Labour Party. The party’s campaign in 1964 put the 
belief in progress through ever-increasing industrial production to the very forefront of its 
platform, message and identity. After 13 years in the wilderness of the opposition, they 
vigorously campaigned for the vision of the “New Britain” which was “going to be 
forged in the white heat of technology” as expressed in Harold Wilson’s defining phrase; 
Labour’s 1964 manifesto was committed to “mobilising the resources of technology 
under a national plan” as its priority.131 Labour stood for modern rational planning for the 
sake of growth that would benefit the entire nation, pitting themselves against the 
antiquated, obsolete Tories and linking them with the perceived British decline. The 
rationale for socialism came to be defined by Fabian technocratism than class politics, let 
alone emancipatory values. Once in office, they drafted the National Plan through the 
Department of Economic Affairs as “Labour’s blueprint for action,” in which they 
unequivocally argued for the supremacy of private manufacturing-driven economic 
growth as foremost priority and aimed to grow the GDP by 25% in five years; their 
emphasis on manufacturing was so extreme that it was even disliked by the 
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Confederation of British Industry (CBI) as too biased.132 The National Plan “contained 
no teeth at all” to properly ensure its success except “by exhortation”, and ended up in 
failure to achieve its own goals.133 However, the National Plan did direct considerable 
investment grants and subsidies to private firms to build capital facilities and Research 
and Development, which amounted to more than £1.1 billion in the 1969-70 fiscal 
year.134 The government assistance to capitalist industry more than tripled since Wilson 
took office in 1964; the rate of increase of public expenditure for “trade and industry” 
was also nearly three times higher than that of social policy expenditure during the six 
years of Labour Government.135 The government’s deflationary turn, due to the adverse 
economic circumstances, further strengthened resolve to improve “competitiveness” 
through continued spending on private industry, while simultaneously squeezing the 
fiscal resources for other policy agendas including social policy. Such an extensive use of 
the state’s fiscal resources to promote private capital accumulation was hardly 
accompanied with any platform to socially determine the character of the production or 
substantial redistribution of capitalist profits. The introduction of capital gains tax in 
1965 did accompany the extensive state promotion of businesses, but it was primarily 
designed to encourage “retention of profits rather than their distribution as dividends” and 
hence investment in production.136 Despite the continued presence of the Clause 4 (the 
Gaitskellite motion to eliminate it was defeated at the Party Conference a few years 
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before), the expansion of public ownership of means of production was limited to the 
steel industry, again with the foremost aim of directly increasing productivity.137  
Labour’s particular conception of productivity based on the primacy of private 
manufacturing is most explicitly manifested in the Selective Employment Tax (SET), 
introduced in July 1966 as part of the crisis budget. SET was designed in order to 
promote the manufacturing sector while punishing the service sector, based on the belief 
that the service sector was absorbing too much labor power and stifling the growth of 
manufacturing. SET was charged on all employers (£ 1.25 per employee), but 
manufacturing industry would receive a refund of the entire amount plus a premium of 
37.5p per employee, while services would receive no refund at all. (Agriculture would get 
refund but no premium.)138 As the net effect of SET on budget was an increase in state 
revenue, James Callaghan, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, saw SET as a less explicit 
and less politically damaging form of tax increase.139 However, short-term political 
expediency aside, the SET as the brainchild of Nicky Kaldor, the Keynesian economist 
and advisor to the government, demonstrates the productivist idea that guided and 
constrained Labour. Kaldor promoted manufacturing-oriented productivism through his 
“growth laws”; that “the fast rates of economic growth are almost invariably associated 
with the fast rate of growth of… manufacturing” since the level and rates of growth of 
productivity is higher in manufacturing than in other sectors, particularly services.140 
Furthermore, he argued that “productivity [would] increase in response to increases in 
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total output” of manufacturing, due to the economies of scale; hence, “a greater 
concentration of labor in manufacturing tends to bring about a higher average rate of 
productivity growth.”141 He posited the virtuous cycle of growth arising out of increase in 
manufacturing production and investment that feed on each other, which greatly 
influenced the government’s belief in the necessity of investment in private 
manufacturing sectors for eventual recovery of high growth rate.  
 
Productivism and the Political Economy of Social Policy 
Productivism lay at the heart of contestations over political economy of the 
welfare state. Despite the attachment to the British welfare state as the Attlee 
government’s legacy, the idea of expansion of the welfare state did not have consensus in 
the Labour Party even in the early Wilson years. The Labour Government of 1964-70 
started to be beleaguered with economic troubles soon after the victorious election of 
March 1966; the crisis of July 1966 was a precursor to recurring crises of increasing 
magnitude in a decade and more to come, and the crucial turning point for the 
government. In July 1966, the Labour government’s decision was to “implement the 
standard Treasury deflationary package,” even though they were faced with “a range of 
options from import controls and defense cuts through devaluation to deflation.”142 The 
wage freeze constituted a major part of the crisis package, as well as spending cuts.143 
Since then, the Labour government often faced an unenviable choice of expenditure 
reduction, import control or devaluation in the face of increasing international market 
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pressures in currency and balance of payments and dealt with them in a mixed manner, 
combining contractionary fiscal policy, devaluation (in November 1967) and insignificant 
use of direct controls.144 Import and exchange controls were discussed as a theoretical 
possibility, but never seriously considered for implementation.145 Due to the 
predominance of deflationary packages over other options, there have been discussions 
on “the end of the Keynesian era” as early as in 1967.146 In January 1968, sweeping 
expenditure cuts put an end to a variety of the government’s signature commitments in 
social policy, such as the expansion of public education (i.e. raising of the school-leaving 
age), public housing and the abolition of NHS prescription charges. Though the 
deflationary budget also contained a substantial reduction of military expenditure through 
withdrawal of imperial “East of Suez” operations and tax increases, there was no 
discussion of alternatives to spending cuts in the face of a blow to Labour’s social justice 
commitments.147 The lower-than-desired growth rate in itself does not explain the reasons 
behind their course of action; the ideas and political dynamics determined how the 
Labour government responded to the economic situations. As Coates puts it, “the 
aspirations… to use State power to redress the uneven distribution of social privileges 
and rights had been abandoned” in the Wilson era because “the search for the conditions 
under which sustained economic growth could be achieved had been allowed to drown 
completely any vestigial interest in social reform”; the retreat from the socialist purpose 
was “part of its overriding commitment to the creation of those conditions under which a 
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predominantly private economy could achieve economic growth.”148 The connections 
between Labour government’s lack of commitment to the welfare state and the 
productivist priorities were also expressed by exasperated Barbara Castle, who 
commented that “we were once again proving that we had no policy for redistributing 
wealth. We couldn’t even find a way of enabling ordinary people to share in the industrial 
increment. Everything had to be subordinated to the management of the economy, and in 
a capitalist one, that meant the continuation of inequality was essential.” 149 
The first Wilson government did implement some quantitative increase in 
National Insurance benefits and provision of personal social services, and introduced 
earnings-related benefits for unemployment, sickness, widows and industrial injuries in 
1966 (which was further extended in 1975); indeed, the quantitative expansion of the 
welfare state in the sixties was significant. 150  These changes were positive and more 
than trivial, despite numerous setbacks that ambitous social policy agendas suffered. 
However, what was of the negative, long-term significance was the failure to make 
qualitative changes to the welfare state towards a more social democratic model, which 
would have institutionally entrenched itself over time. The ideas underlining the 1964-70 
Labour Government were an immediate precursor to those that shaped Labour’s 
performance in the critical 1970s, and therefore had important path-dependence 
implications. In particular, the politics over unsuccessful attempts to establish the 
incomes guarantee and public supplementary pension clarifies the starting point of path 
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divergence from the potential development towards the social democratic model, the truly 
universalistic public welfare system with a broad political base that is high-quality and 
relevant for the majority of the people, not only for the most dispossessed.  
The incomes guarantee, originally proposed as a measure to alleviate the 
inadequacy of the pension system, was also designed to solidify the idea of social rights 
as a major step towards de-commodification. It was modelled after the non-means-tested 
Swedish housing benefits, which constitutes a part of the distinct social democratic model 
of social policy.151 Labour’s 1964 election manifesto made an explicit commitment that 
“for those already retired and for widows, an incomes guarantee will be introduced. 
Those whose incomes fall below the new minimum will receive as of right, and without 
recourse to National Assistance, an income supplement”; the novel idea gained 
widespread attention in the 1964 campaign.152 However, disorganization and the general 
lack of commitment to such a transformative change soon took the incomes guarantee off 
the government’s agenda and prevented its implementation; and so did the consideration 
that the guaranteed minimum income “would not contribute towards faster economic 
growth”, as succinctly and unequivocally expressed in the National Plan. 153  
The most consequential of the failure of potential qualitative changes can be 
found in their pension politics. In 1957, the Labour Party conference adopted the 
substantial reform agendas for National Superannuation. Developed by Richard 
Crossman in consultation with the eminent social policy scholar Richard Titmuss, the 
reform would have created an expansive, redistribute public pension system which would 
be the basis of the “middle-class welfare state.” The basic Beveridge-style pension 
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scheme, established in 1946, was so inadequate that many seniors had to seek further 
means-tested assistance, and led to the bifurcation between grossly inadequate flat-rate 
public pension and the additional private pension for the middle-class, which Crossman 
called the “apartheid in the old age” and had robbed the public pension system of the 
original universalist principles.154 Not only the comprehensive public pension scheme 
would obviate the large-scale private pension funds and consolidate the political base of 
the universalist welfare state, the public pension fund would function as a massive public 
investment fund, enabling the government to make investment decisions based on social 
and public priorities.155 The Crossman plan was equivalent of the Swedish supplementary 
pension scheme (Allmän Tilläggspension, ATP), the crowning achievement of Swedish 
social democracy. ATP was instrumental in institutionalizing the political base of support 
for the welfare state among the newly-emerging middle class, and also amassed massive 
investment funds which could be used to democratically make the investment decisions 
for these capital. The Swedish Social Democrats recognized its crucial importance, and 
vigorously pursued it against strong bourgeois oppositions in the fifties, going so far as to 
dissolve the Parliament for it and hold a successful national referendum in 1958. 
As with the incomes guarantee proposal, the Labour Government hesitated in 
inaction on pension reform for more than three years since 1964, even after they had won 
the comfortable majority in the 1966 election. Furthermore, pension programs’ fiscal 
impact is of enormous importance since it comprised two-thirds of the entire social policy 
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expenditure.156 The issue finally came to surface again when Richard Crossman was 
appointed Secretary for Social Services in 1968, but the original plan for public 
supplementary pension was diluted so as to protect the considerable presence of the 
private occupational schemes through contracting-out provisions. The compromised 
reform plan was finally introduced in January 1970, but ultimately failed to pass before 
Wilson dissolved the Parliament for an election, again demonstrating their utter lack of 
commitment to reform.157 After the years of stagnation in pension politics, Labour was 
able to pass the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1975, spearheaded 
by Castle who was serving as Secretary for Social Services. SERPS created a public, 
redistributive supplementary pension in addition to the existing flat-rate pension, and tied 
the levels of basic public pension to price or wage levels, whichever was higher, to end 
the pensioners’ reliance on means-tested assistance.158 While SERPS did mark a high 
point of Labour’s postwar social policy achievements, it could not become substantial 
enough to institutionally entrench itself or create the socio-political foundation of the 
expansive welfare state (unlike the Swedish ATP) due to the public spending cuts.  
As the sixties came to an end, even more systemic and deeper crisis of the entire 
Fordist-Keynesian mode of production started to surface. Unemployment rose by nearly 
60% from 1964 to 1970, and corporate profitability declined markedly throughout the 
sixties, indicating the lack of success of their productivist vision outlined in the National 
Plan; the structural economic crisis in Britain mirrored that of the global economy, in 
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which the crisis of overproduction started to surface since the late sixties.159 The failure 
of the first Wilson government to accomplish its own goals, let alone liberatory political 
causes, energized the Labour Left to an extent unseen since the 1930s. Labour’s defeat in 
1970 discredited the “unbridled pursuit of economic growth under private control” of the 
early Wilson years, and altered the rhetoric and terms of debate in the party.160 The surge 
of trade unions’ power and labor militancy, which was facilitated by the two decades of 
Keynesian full employment and the consequent strengthening of its structural power, 
proved to be a crucial factor that enabled the leftist resurgence; trade unions were no 
longer the reliable bulwark of conservatism in the party. The powerful mobilization of the 
Labour Left led to their major victory at the 1973 Party Conference that adopted the 
Labour’s Programme for Britain, a radically socialist program unthinkable a decade 
before. The Programme pledged to create “no less than a new social order” that “put[s] 
the principles of democracy and Socialism above considerations of privilege and market 
economics,” by “bring[ing] about a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of 
power and wealth in favour of working people and their families.”161 In addition to 
extensive nationalization, the Programme pledged “a substantial shift in the emphasis 
now put on job creation, housing, education and social benefits” in order to “increase 
social equality,” and to “improve the environment” as well.162 Labour’s 1974 election 
manifestoes were more moderate than the Programme, but promised the “fundamental 
and irreversible shift” in both election campaigns that year.  
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 However, the Programme’s goal was soon frustrated with the intensifing fiscal 
crisis and inflation. Despite the constant setbacks in social policy and the fact that Britain 
recorded the lowest growth rate of welfare spending among the major OECD countries, 
the public expenditure did indeed increase throughout the 1960s.163 In 1971, state 
expenditure comprised 50.3% of Britain’s GDP and roughly half of the state expenditure 
(23.8% of the GDP) was spent on social services, compared to 42.1% and 17.6% 
respectively a decade before.164 The causes of the rising proportion of state expenditure 
can be attributed to the rise of relative costs of welfare services such as health and 
education due to the so-called “Baumol’s disease,” growing needs for income 
maintenance because of increasing unempoyment, successful struggles of public sector 
unions and improved services or coverage to a certain extent.165 As the “Labour 
Government of 1974-79 faced the toughest set of public expenditure decisions that had 
been confronted by any government since 1922,” public welfare spending was faulted as 
the cause of inflation, budget decifit and an obstacle to more “productive” investment by 
the dominant, establishment Right of the Labour Party, which was particularly strong in 
the Parliamentary Party and occupying the key posts including Prime Minister and 
Chancellor of the Exchequer.166 Hence, even though the high-quality and expansive 
social services were pledged in the manifesto, public sector spending started to be cut as 
early as in November 1974, and the pattern continued and accelerated throughout the life 
of the Wilson-Callaghan government; in November 1975, expenditure cap was set upon 
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all programmes for cost control.167 The Labour government did accomplish significant, 
progressive reforms in social policy such as Child Benefits Act and State Earnings 
Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) in 1975. However, these were too little and too late to 
accomplish any macro-level alternative to the trend towards welfare state retrenchment.  
Faced with the severe concerns over inflationary and fiscal impact of public 
welfare spending, the Labour Right combined productivism with the belief in 
accommodation with the forces of private capital and open market, which is 
emblematically reflected in Healey’s statement that “the Government must live with the 
judgments of the [international] market, whether they like them or not.”168 The 
imperative to seek investor confidence in the market demanded that they subordinate 
social agendas to creating conditions most conducive to capitalist investment, and it was 
clearly manifested in the debate over the Cabinet decision to accept IMF bailout in 
December 1976. The IMF bailout was the most dramatic and fateful, “a political decision 
as grave as any in our history” as described by Tony Benn.169 The debate was about the 
starkly different paths for British political economy after the collapse of the Keynesian 
consensus. As the economic growth slowed and the Keynesian solution to satisfy both 
social and market imperatives became increasingly unavailable, productivism with 
reformist faith in capitalism led them towards proto-monetarist radical retrenchment, as 
exemplified in Healey’s remark during a tense Cabinet debate; “we must fortify 
confidence and we could do that by reshaping PSBR [budget deficit]; for example, cuts in 
public expenditure would be very welcome and the supplemenetary benefit and 
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unemployment pay are factors here… if we are going to cut those or reduce them we 
could reduce the rates of tax on higher incomes. We must have more incentives for our 
managers.”170   
The IMF-imposed stringent conditions due to the acceptance of the bailout in 
1976, as well as the spending cuts initiated on its own by the government, further 
drastically limited the government’s fiscal autonomy undermined their social policy 
commitment in the Social Contract, including increased public expenditure for the 
welfare state and extension of public ownership. The conditions for accepting IMF loans 
included substantial reduction of subsidies for food, expenditure for education and public 
purchase of housing; the Wilson-Callaghan government ended up presiding over the 
“largest cuts in real public expenditure that have occurred in the last fifty years.”171 The 
1978 Supplementary Benefit Review explicitly put a renewed emphasis upon means-
tested benefits, reversing the progress made only three years before. The effect was “like 
rack-renting a house”  as one commentator put it.172 Labour’s proto-neoliberal social 
policy intended to maintain capitalist profit and manufacturing investment at the expense 
of reproduction of labor power, whose effect would be to sacrifice social development, 
leaving the people less educated and less healthier; the retrenchment led to long, growing 
NHS waiting lists, deficiency in educational quality, and gross poverty and inequality for 
low-paid workers and the increasing number of unemployed.173 At the same time, 
retrenchment also meant the pursuit of more capitalist accumulation at the expense of 
lower renumerations and longer hours for domestic labor and consequent restrictions on 
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women’s equal opportunities in labor market, since more care labor was transferred to the 
unpaid, domestic realm. As discussed below, the masculinist ideology of the family 
served as an ideological basis upon which reductions of the welfare state was justified.  
 Productivism itself was hardly a belief held only by the Right. The alternative, 
Left solutions proposed by Tony Benn were as productivist as it could get, as he was a 
firm believer in achieving faster productivity growth through nationalization of industries. 
The Alternative Economic Policy (AES) on the Left advocated for demand stimulation 
through reflation, protection of domestic industries through import control, and planned, 
efficient investment in the nationalized manufacturing industries, all of which would 
culminate in a faster economic growth.174 While the AES advocated for the expansion of 
the social services as well, the proponents still tended to see them as additional to the 
core industrial program. As feminist theorist Anne Phillips puts it, AES-supporting 
“socialists argue that they can do what capitalism used to do, only better.”175 Therefore, 
productivism enjoyed a hegemonic status in the Labour Party and the Cabinet, since there 
was no major group contesting its tenet. Both the Labour Left and the Right saw the 
untenability of the continuation of the Keynesian consensus, and agreed upon the 
imperative to revive and accelerate GDP growth through manufacturing. The Left 
believed that achievement of efficiency through nationalization, import substitution and 
reflation of domestic demand for manufactured goods; the Right believed that growth 
was best achieved through courting private investments through the international market 
and increasing exports. Labour was locked in the path of ideational path dependence, 
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which ran through the Party’s history but particularly so since the call for solutions based 
upon the “white heat of technology.”  
 Considering that the Labour Left that vehemently opposed the IMF settlement and 
the proto-neoliberal path since 1976 was also productivist, the immediate cause of the 
victory of the proto-neoliberal course should be attributed to the Labour leadership’s faith 
in captalism and antipathy to alternative, socialistic solutions. Furthermore, the Labour 
membership was deeply opposed to the leadership’s direct rejection of social democracy, 
and the Right majority in the Cabinet wasn’t even confident of winning the support of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party.176 The lack of the Labour government and party leaders’ 
accountability to the membership, which was to be a point of heated contention in the 
intra-party politics in the years to come, rendered it impossible for the party activists to 
stop their own party’s betrayal of their cause.177 Also, the strong capitalist bias of the 
Treasury and its unparalleled research resources gave a considerable advantage to the 
proto-monetarist side of the debate. Benn had to admit the relative incompleteness of the 
alternative strategy because he “ha[s]n’t got the resources of an economic Ministry 
behind [him].”178 The Treasury had the power to create perceptions of the state of the 
economy through the information and statistics they give to the government. Even Healey 
admits that he reduced the public spending more than necessary because the Treasury 
was “misleading the Government… about the true state of public spending in Britain” 
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and suspects that “the Treasury officials were content to overstate public spending in 
order to put pressure on governments which were reluctant to cut it.”179 
 However, hegemonic productivism induced and predisposed them towards the 
proto-neoliberal retrenchment agenda. Firstly, desire for productivist growth furnished a 
powerful, convincing reason to accommodate to the dictates of private capital and the 
market. While Benn and his supporters argued that nationalization and import control 
were more conducive to economic growth over the long or medium term, it would be far 
more difficult to argue against the negative short-term implications of the left-
productivist strategy, which is what Przeworskian “valley of transition” illustrates. As 
demonstrated above, the immediate imperative to satisfy the market was frequently and 
successfully deployed by the Right of the party. Healey was able to justify his course of 
action as that of “an eclectic pragmatist” who simply did what was best and necessary for 
the economy, because of the assumption that “most people would agree that the first 
responsibility of any chancellor is to manage the economy so as to produce the best 
possible combination of high growth and low inflation.”180 Despite his claim to have had 
“deep scepticism about all systematic economic theories,” the idea of productivist growth, 
as well as capitalism, was so hegemonic that he did not even consider it as an ideology or 
part of a “systematic economic theory.”181 What David Harvey describes as “the Fordist 
political consensus that redistributions should be funded out of growth,” and the resulting 
notion that “slackening growth inevitably meant trouble for the welfare state and the 
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social wage” are based on nothing but a particular value system which holds ever-
increasing private material consumption to be a foremost goal.182  
Furthermore, productivism undergirded the discourses that consider public 
welfare services to be unproductive, and entrenched “declinist” discourses that denigrate 
the performance of the postwar British welfare state. As the productivist ideology defined 
the aim of political economy to be faster GDP increase in itself rather than the 
accomplishment of social goals, it came to pursue the former even at the expense of the 
latter. It privileged manufacturing and undervalued social services, based on the Kaldor’s 
growth laws that stipulate that manufacturing would contribute to GDP growth more than 
services. Therefore, productivist ideology ensures that expenditure concerning 
reproduction of labor power and social relations – social services – is cut first. The 
priority accorded to GDP growth is based upon certain values, since it cannot properly 
measure the well-being created through public services. As Howard Glennerster wrote in 
a widely-discussed New Statesman article on public expenditure, “the larger the share of 
public expenditure that is accounted for by public services, the less relevant GDP growth 
has to any measure of individuals’ welfare.”183 “Baumol’s disease” indicates that services 
tend to be more expensive over time in relation to goods, but neither does it measure the 
use value of each. It is true, as productivists on the Labour Left and the Right argue, that 
the significance of manufacturing lay in the need for adequate exports in order to finance 
imports. However, beyond the minimal level of import which could proceed even under 
import control, the trade-off between private consumption of imports and social services 
is a political question without any objective economic answer. The dominant ideology 
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dictated that more consumption was worth sacrificing the public services, which is 
starkly demonstrated by Callaghan who argued that “we must reduce tax levels at the top 
and bottom” at the very moment he was proposing the drastic spending cuts by £1 
billion.184 
Because of these ideas, the possibility to conceptualize the welfare state as a 
resource for the economy and a source of investment and job creation was precluded. The 
welfare state was seen as no more than the channel for income transfer and immediate 
consumption (as opposed to investment), which was too superfluous and profligate in the 
times of economic crisis and misguided allocation of resources, even though the welfare 
state also includes production of services, albeit at a presumably slower growth rate than 
manufacturing. The perception of the need to concentrate resources upon private 
manufacturing was expressed in numerous remarks by the leaders of the Labour 
Government. Denis Healey, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared his intention to 
make “the shift in resources into exports and investment [his] first priority in economic 
management” over public expenditure in the November 1974 budget speech, and bluntly 
stated that “what we have to do is to shift more people from the public to the private 
sector.”185 While Healey claims that he did not agree with the “right-wing economists 
[who argued that] Britain’s poor record was… due to excessive public spending, high 
taxation, the trade unions, or the welfare state”, his counterpoint that  “it was due to 
inadequate investment, leading to low productivity” indicates the welfare state should be 
sacrificed for the sake of investment when fiscal resources are limited.186 Callaghan also 
made repeated remarks to offer his ideological justification of welfare cuts. In April 1976, 
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soon after his inauguration as Prime Minister, he argued that “investments on which a 
sensible rate of return can be expected… is the way we shall get full employment – not 
by transferring more and more jobs to the public sector.”187 He commented during the 
Cabinet debate on the day of IMF bailout decision that  “we must deal with social 
security benefits” by reducing it because he perceived the only available choices to be 
“between hitting the construction industry with the high unemployment that would follow 
or reducing the upgrading of the benefits.”188 Echoing these hegemonic ideas, the official 
government White Paper explained the rationale for drastic cuts in 1976 as “to make 
possible a shift of resources into industrial investment and exports.”189 The 1974-79 
government’s actions demonstrate its belief; it was the capital investment in public 
welfare services which were hit the hardest in the Wilson-Callaghan years. Capital 
spending on social services declined even in the 1973-75 period, and in the 1975-77 
period it declined by astonishing 22% while current spending slighly increased; by the 
1977-78 fiscal year, capital spending in education and the personal social services were 
less than half of the figure recorded in the year 1973-74.190 After all, the political costs of 
reducing the immediately visible current spending were higher than targeting investment 
in social services that would matter in the long-term, as long as they regarded the welfare 
state as cash drain and not the basis of future economy. This hegemonic dichotomy of 
productive manufacturing and less productive social services reigned throughout the 
party as a consequence of path dependence on Labour’s ideational heritage, even though 
many on the Left deemed social policy expenditure as more important than did the Right.  
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Labour Party, Masculinism and the Welfare State 
Productivism and masculinism concur in their aim to fund more capital 
accumulation or private consumption by shifting the burden of care labor from the paid 
public realm to the unpaid, domestic realm. Masculinism values the production of what is 
culturally considered to be “man’s job” more than those seen as “woman’s job”, thus it 
functioned as an ideological framework that promotes and lends solid credence to the 
productivist narrative that devalues care services and the process of reproduction of labor 
power, and contributed to the perception that social expenditure was unproductive. By 
doing so, productivist-masculinism not only puts women in an unfair labor market 
position by increasing their care burden, but it also reduces resources for the direct job 
creation for women through the welfare state itself, since the public care services 
employed large numbers of female professionals while in manufacturing sectors a small 
proportion of women workers tend to be relegated to marginal positions.191 Path 
depenence of the hegemonic masculinism of the Labour Party based on the exaltation of 
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“men’s job” systematically obstructed the development of the Fordist familiarist welfare 
state towards the social democratic model. 
The postwar Fordist welfare state, which the Labour’s Attlee Government played 
a predominant role in its creation in Britain, thoroughly institutionalized the male 
breadwinner model. Beveridge summarized its assumption as that “the great majority of 
married women must be regarded as occupied on work which is vital though unpaid, 
without which their husbands could not do their paid work and without which the nation 
could not continue”; Labour proceeded to realize the idea promoted by the architect of 
the postwar welfare state.192 Despite Beveridge’s recognition of domestic labor as “vital”, 
however, it was responsibility without power for the women engaged in it. The primary 
responsibility of care labor – reproduction of labor power as well as maintenance of non-
working population –was assigned to women in the family through familiarist social 
policy, such as the “cohabitation rule” that highly restricted access to means-tested 
benefits, designation of married couple as a taxable unit, and “dependents” category in 
the National Insurance. Furthermore, as the labor market and collective bargaining 
regimes conspired to limit women’s capacities to obtain equal, full employment 
opportunities, the distinctions between full-time workers and their dependents in National 
Insurance functioned in a gender-discriminatory manner. Put simply, the postwar British 
social policy was to guarantee “reasonable security of employment for the breadwinner,” 
and to consolidate women’s structural dependence upon their husbands on the 
assumption that all husbands are somehow benevolent and there is no distributional 
conflict within the families.193 The Family Allowances directly paid by the state to 
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mothers constitute a major exception in a sense that it promotes women’s financial 
independence, despite being deeply maternalistic. However, it has been comparatively 
meagre, and hardly adequate as the basis of livelihood for the mother and her children; 
therefore it remains “a subordinated and contested part of a welfare system organized 
largely around the wage.”194  
These masculinist norms were pervasive throughout the postwar British society, 
and the Labour Party thoroughly absorbed the spirit of the male breadwinner model, even 
though it was always more of a myth than a reality for all women. The working-class was 
regularly discursively constructed as a class of working men and the party culture 
strongly reflected and replicated the male breadwinner model, as “the socialist movement 
in Britain has been swept off its feet by the magic of masculinity.”195 The popular 
identification of the Labour Party with masculinity was so strong that the Conservatives 
were able to retain the lead in support among female voters, albeit in a maternalistic 
manner, until the Thatcherite era.196 Gender roles and hierarchy also pervaded within the 
party; the menial tasks of catering, cleaning and envelope-stuffing were assigned to the 
party’s women volunteers while the powerful and public roles of conducting meetings, 
holding positions of power and campaigning on the streets were reserved for men, and 
women were even issued a differently-colored membership card.197 Women’s sections of 
the party also tended to accept the male breadwinner model and conceive “women’s 
issues” as domestic duties in a conservative-maternalist rather than feminist way; 
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feminist party activists later criticized that they were only serving as a place for “pleasant, 
rather aimless social occasions” and perpetuating the notion that women were not serious 
political activists.198 In 1967, a long-term woman activist described the Labour Party to 
be “the most male-dominated and masculine-oriented movement” that she had ever 
encountered.199  
The vigorous second-wave feminist movement swept through Britain since the 
late 1960s, pulling the Labour Party out of the “nadir of women’s rights” in the 1950s 
and 60s. Despite the decades steeped in masculinist ideology and culture, feminist 
agendas were able to make inroads within the party to a certain extent. Because of the 
espoused emancipatory ideals and the rise of the Left within the party, Labour was a 
natural choice and target for feminist activists attempting to influence mainstream politics. 
Labour spearheaded great social reforms such as legalization of abortion (1967), 
liberalization of divorce laws (1969) and basic, legal equal pay provisions (1970, 1975) 
as well as SERPS and Child Benefits, and most of the demands pressed by the 1970 
women’s liberation conference at least started to be discussed within the party by the end 
of the 1970s.200 The most active years of British feminism coincided with the Labour’s 
fateful years amid the collapse of Keynesian consensus, but the feminist mobilization was 
too marginal to transform the ideology of political economy among the party leadership. 
Indeed, Maureen Colquhoun, a new Labour MP elected in 1974, noted that she could not 
find any Labour MPs who were “feminist” and wanted to dismantle the patriarchal 
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society, and Callaghan often deployed the discourse of familiarism as the retrenchment 
began.201  
The trajectory of Labour’s social policy agendas reflects the party’s masculinism, 
which functioned to strengthen productivist anti-welfarism. Women’s equal employment 
opportunities and just remuneration for domestic labor require de-familirization of care 
work, and hence the extensive welfare state to make public care labor for reproduction of 
labor power and maintenance of non-working population, which is de-
commodification.202 However, where women’s domestic dependence continues to 
constrain their freedom and perpetuates the system of unpaid domestic labor, 
commodification of women’s labor needs to take place before it can be de-commodified 
again. As analyzed above, in Labour Britain, productivist priorities for investment in 
private manufacturing for the sake of maximum GDP growth diverted funds from an 
extensive public provision of welfare, constituting the process of path divergence from 
the development of social democratic model. However, the policy development can also 
be re-examined through the lens of masculinist causes, which are especially relevant on 
the politics and policies on supplementary pension and child care. Indeed, had they been 
enacted, these programmes would have paved the path from the Beveridgean, solidaristic 
yet minimal welfare model to the Social Democratic, de-commodifying, de-familiarizing 
welfare state which could be built upon the Beveridgean foundations.203  
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The failure of the Crossman pension plan was influenced by masculinism. 
Scepticism among male-dominant trade unions for the scheme played an important role 
in dampening support for the transformative reform. Due to the tax deductions for private 
pension as well as the inadequate level of public flat-rate pension, many better-off (male) 
workers had generous, private pension schemes based on the family wage system and 
wives’ dependence on their husbands’ entitlement; they condemned the Crossman plan as 
an infringement upon already-existing entitlements.204 Staunch union opposition to the 
original plan that “express[ed] hostility to employers’ supplementary schemes”, in the 
words of the chair of TUC’s Social Insurance Committee, led to introduction of a private 
contracting-out provision as a compromise, robbing it of any transformative potentials.205 
Trade union workers’ attachment to the private, occupational pension schemes promoted 
by the previous Conservative governments is a classic case of path dependence; the 
private system created and reproduced powerful stakeholders with an interest in 
perpetuating it. However, it was also a gendered interest; due to the predominance of 
part-time work among women and exclusion of part-time workers from most 
occupational pension plans, less than 10 percent of women were estimated to have been 
enrolled in them.206 Within the Labour Party, there were very few figures paying 
attention to the dependent status of the majority of women, Barbara Castle 
notwithstanding.207 The masculinist conception encouraged them to uphold the existing 
private supplementary pension, which mirrored and magnified the gross gender 
inequality in employment. 
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The root of gendered income disparities in old age and consequent intra-family 
power inequality is in the labor market – both women’s lower level of labor market 
participation itself and the high proportion of part-time employment among women that 
don’t qualify them for occupational pension -, and the public supplementary pension 
wouldn’t necessarily ameliorate it, especially if the scheme is strictly earnings-related. 
However, while the public supplementary pension can simply entrench the gender 
divisions, the public, universal, citizenship based system is structurally able to account 
for years spent outside of the labor market due to engagement in care labor (Swedish 
ATP recognizes four qualifying years for each child), and indeed most state pension 
schemes in Western Europe make some allowances for the period of caring for 
children.208 It is far more difficult, if not impossible, for private, employment-based 
schemes to account for care labor not performed for the employer. Therefore, the more 
extensive and redistributive the public pension scheme is, the better chance there is for it 
to be conducive to gender equality.  
SERPS established supplementary public pension for those who were unable to 
contribute to occupational pension schemes and protected those with caring 
responsibilities by basing the entitlement upon the highest-earning 20 years of working 
life, which was called the Home Responsibilities Protection Provisions.209 In SERPS, the 
the category of the spouse with reduced individual contributions were abolished for new 
entrants. These provisions rectified the gender gap, and Castle had a clear, resolute 
agenda that “the married women’s option had to go” in order to “get rid of Beveridge’s 
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concept of women’s dependency.”210 In contrast with the masculinist failure of the 
Crossman plan, the movement away from masculinism spurred one of the most positive 
accomplishments of the Labour’s social policy. 
Along with pension, the Family Allowances were the most significant for gender 
politics of income transfer programs. While the ambivalences of the Family Allowances 
due to its institutionalization of women’s domesticity and maternity are well-documented, 
it is undeniable that it provided women – including women as single parents and women 
with a full-time job - the independent source of compensation for their domestic labor, 
albeit only for parenting.211 The first Wilson government successfully implemented a 
major 50p increase in the allowances, which was to be partially funded through increase 
tax rates for the rich in order to make it redistributive. However, the reform proposed and 
advocated for by Peggy Herbison, Minister of Social Security, to qualitatively expand the 
allowances faced stiff internal opposition. As the proposal opened up a space for debate 
on family allowances, Callaghan led a vehement attack against the Herbison plan and 
even proposed to end the concept of universal family allowances itself by introducing 
means-testing.212 Callaghan’s radical anti-universalism, which was not even implemented 
during the Thatcher years, was supported by the strong minority in the Cabinet including 
Healey.213 Even as the universalist principle was preserved by the smaller-than-expected 
majority, Callaghan then insisted upon reducing the size of increase by half or funding it 
through cuts in other social services, reflecting the widespread concerns over “productive” 
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use of resources. Labour’s emblematic attachment to the welfare state did prevail in this 
case, but it took a prolonged battle which saw Herbison’s resignation in protest.  
Labour’s 1974-79 government accomplished the enaction of Child Benefits Act 
1975. The major reform legislation implemented a simple system of a flat-rate benefit, 
indexed to the price levels, to a carer of each child; it replaced the dual system of Family 
Allowance and Child Tax Allowances. The abolition of Child Tax Allowances and the 
consequent increase in Child Benefits was successful in redistributing the payment for 
care from the breadwinner in the labor market to the actual carer of the children (even 
though the Allowances were made to be phased out three years later, in order to appease 
masculinists), and the active women’s liberation movement was instrumental in defeating 
Callaghan’s attempt to direct the new Child Benefits to the breadwinner.214 Due to the 
universality of the program and its compatibility with dominant maternalist discourses, 
the political support for child benefit has been comparatively well-established, making 
the 1975 reform one of the few significant, positive social policy accomplishments made 
by the government in continuous crisis. However, on the other hand, the Labour 
government also instituted in the same year the blatant denial of the Invalid Care 
Allowances to married or cohabiting women, who “might be home at any event” in the 
words of a White Paper, since caring for disabled relatives was seen to be a “natural” job 
for female relatives that does not warrant compensation. The government was successful 
in ensuring that 99.5% of the 1.25 million carers in Britain did not receive the 
allowances.215  
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Compared to the compensation for those who perform domestic care labor for 
children, the development of public provision of child care services – de-familiarization 
of child care – lagged behind in the extreme. The lack of non-domestic child care 
provisions constitutes the single biggest obstacle for women’s independence from 
domesticity; more than 85% of women with a child below school age gave up full 
employment in the early 1980s.216 The universal provision of child care is sine qua non 
for gender justice in political economy; simply put, “without comprehensive child care 
facilities, women’s right to work remain a farce.”217 Gender inequality in employment is 
the root cause of many kinds of oppressions structured by the welfare state, such as 
women’s dependence upon their husbands or cohabiting “partners” and inequality in 
social security entitlements. De-familiarization of child care received far less attention 
from the party compared to other social policy issues, and social services’ importance 
was far less acknowledged than that of income security measures. Provision of other 
social services to relieve the burden of women’s domestic labor, which expanded until 
the early seventies, also became the first target of spending cuts.218 It would have been 
easier to be repelled by absolute poverty than by what many feminist activists called 
“prostitutional dependence,” but it signifies the lack of commitment to utilize the welfare 
state to restructure social relations.  
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The only public provision of child care as a social right was made through day 
nurseries, which provided all-day care and are heavily subsidized. However, it was 
intended for children whose family environment was regarded as problematic, to whom 
the prioritized access was given; hence, it was almost impossible for “normal” working 
mothers and their children to obtain a spot.219 Therefore, the capacity was minimal; it 
declined from 62,784 in 1945 to 21,396 in 1965, and then barely rose to 28,400 in 1980, 
in the country with more than 3 million children under the age five.220 There is not even 
reliable data on labor market participation among mothers who used day nurseries. More 
widely accessible was nursery schools, which were available only for children over three; 
it is not so useful for full-time working mothers since it follows normal school hours and 
holidays, and the majority of children only attended half-day. More children (291,579 in 
1974) attend nursery classes at primary school, most of whom are four-year-olds starting 
primary school a year early, which can hardly be considered as childcare provision. 221 
Child minders were estimated to be the most widely used childcare services, but its 
coverage is sporadic and quality is uncertain. 222 Private coverage was scarce and not 
made tax deductible, and few local authorities compiled an usable list of private 
services.223  
The Labour Party’s approach to the issue was characterized by lack of concern 
and inaction, which followed the pattern of the entire society. The Seebohm Report by 
the Royal Commission in 1968 recommended an extension of day nurseries, to ensure 
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accessibility for mothers who “had to” work; the Department of Health and Social 
Services (DHSS) refused to consider the matter without any active ministerial 
involvement. 224 Pressed by the emerging women’s liberation movements, Labour’s 
October 1974 manifesto included “exten[sion of] nursery education and day care 
facilities” for the first time under “a Charter for Women,” along with Equal Pay Act, 
maternity leave, child cash allowance and free family planning service.225 However, soon 
after the election the DHSS cut capital expenditure on already-scarce day nurseries by 
20%, as the target of the very first round of spending cuts initiated by the government.226 
As the parliament as a whole never even considered the issue of child care as legislation 
and the ministerial inaction continued, meeting child care needs of the growing group of 
working mothers was haphazardly left to underfunded local authorities, to an extent they 
were willing.227 Nursery schools, as opposed to nursery care, were slighly more often 
discussed and promoted as part of education policy, rather than gender politics. Joan 
Lestor, Under-Secretary of State for Education and Science, took up the cause of nursery 
education, and resigned in protest against the lowest priority accorded to the capital 
expenditure on nurseries which stopped dozens of local authorities from expanding 
nursery school systems. In her resignation speech, she appealed; “the White Paper says 
that, in spite of the reduced capital expenditure on provision for the under-5s, it is still 
possible to ensure that acceptable standards of accommodation will be provided in areas 
of greatest need. How on earth do we know that?... All the evidence available to me 
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suggests that… they will cut back regardless of need.”228 Her call went unheeded, and the 
capacity of full-day nursery schools continued to contract during the tenure of the 
government.229 
After Labour’s defeat in 1979, continued mobilization of feminist movements and 
the rising strength of the left in the party, Lestor stood up for the cause of nurseries once 
again. Having witnessed drastic Thatcherite cuts, as well as the continued rise of female 
labor force, she approached it from a decidedly feminist perspective in her parliamentary 
speech in November 1982;  
“When	  a	  Government	  cut	  social	  services,	  they	  cut	  the	  social	  wage	  of	  the	  country.	  It	  is	  not	  
sufficient	  to	  look	  at	  how	  wages	  have	  risen	  or	  fallen.	  When	  the	  social	  wage	  and	  services	  are	  cut,	  
that	  represents	  a	  cut	  in	  people's	  wages,	  because	  the	  services	  are	  taken	  away	  and	  the	  burden	  
falls	  on	  certain	  sections	  of	  the	  community.	  The	  current	  lack	  of	  services	  results	  in	  a	  dramatic	  
increase	  in	  the	  burden	  on	  women.	  Many	  women	  are	  being	  forced	  to	  give	  up	  jobs	  so	  that	  they	  can	  
provide	  for	  members	  of	  the	  family	  the	  care	  that	  the	  Welfare	  State	  is	  no	  longer	  able	  to	  provide.	  It	  
is	  interesting	  that	  although	  there	  is	  a	  growing	  demand	  on	  women	  to	  provide	  services,	  as	  the	  
Government	  force	  local	  authorities	  to	  restrict	  spending,	  the	  invalid	  care	  allowance	  is	  not	  payable	  
to	  married	  or	  cohabiting	  women.	  Yet	  the	  Government	  expect	  those	  women—indeed,	  they	  rely	  
upon	  them—to	  provide	  those	  services.	  The	  Government	  rely	  on	  those	  women	  to	  supply	  the	  
provision	  that	  is	  no	  longer	  available.	  Yet	  the	  same	  women	  are	  denied	  or	  robbed	  of	  the	  financial	  
assistance	  that	  would	  enable	  them	  to	  make	  that	  provision	  properly.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  that	  the	  
Government	  must	  consider	  when	  they	  talk	  of	  any	  further	  restrictions	  on	  services.	  Women	  are	  
losing	  their	  jobs	  and	  therefore	  the	  income	  that	  that	  they	  need	  to	  make	  adequate	  provision.	  They	  
are	  denied	  the	  financial	  compensation	  that	  they	  need…	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Two-­‐thirds	  of	  women	  in	  the	  35	  to	  54	  year	  age	  group—those	  most	  likely	  to	  have	  to	  care	  
for	  relatives	  because	  of	  lack	  of	  provision—are	  at	  work.	  They	  will	  be	  increasingly	  called	  upon	  to	  
give	  up	  their	  jobs	  so	  that	  they	  can	  look	  after	  relatives	  and	  others	  for	  whom	  local	  authorities	  can	  
no	  longer	  make	  provision….	  Only	  24	  per	  cent.	  of	  day	  care	  for	  young	  children	  of	  pre-­‐school	  age	  is	  
provided	  by	  local	  authorities.	  The	  rest	  is	  provided	  by	  child	  minders,	  relatives	  and	  a	  variety	  of	  
forms	  of	  private	  care.	  	  In	  some	  local	  authority	  areas,	  there	  are	  500	  pre-­‐school	  children	  on	  the	  
waiting	  list	  for	  day	  nurseries.…	  the	  Government	  are	  taking	  away	  the	  provision	  for	  the	  care	  of	  the	  
pre-­‐school	  child….	  Women	  will	  continue	  to	  be	  discriminated	  against	  because	  they	  will	  be	  forced	  
back	  into	  the	  home	  to	  do	  the	  job	  that	  the	  Government	  and	  the	  local	  authorities	  should	  be	  
doing.”230	  
Lestor sketched an alternative vision of Labour politics, which could have 
changed their path at a crucial moment in history. However, few realized the need for 
such an alternative before Thatcher, and by the time she made the speech Thatcher was 
on her way to establishing a long reign. The non-productivist, non-masculinist conception 
of social democracy, let alone socialism, never took hold in the Labour Party, before they 
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Chapter 4: Trade Unions and the Social Contract 
“Apart from [trade unions’] original purposes, they must now learn to act 
deliberately as organising centres of the working class in the broad interest of its 
complete emancipation. They must aid every social and political movement tending in 
that direction.” – Karl Marx, Address to the First International (1866)  
 
Introduction 
Jack Jones, a legendary trade unionist and General Secretary of the Transport and 
General Workers’ Union (TGWU), was perceived to be the “most powerful man in 
Britain” by the majority of people in 1977.231 His power was certainly exaggerated, fed 
off by the right-wing discourse of unaccountable, domineering union boss; in a capitalist 
society, a union leader can never be stronger than the power of capital. However, the 
influence and prominence of trade unions was very real in the British seventies; industrial 
relations occupied a dominant place in politics. Class conflict between capital and labor is 
a fundamental feature of any capitalist society, but the strength of trade unions in Britain 
in the seventies opened a prospect for a profound contestation over, and transformation of, 
British political economy. As union actions came to dominate the political scene, trade 
union leaders became household names, and the stakes and relevance of industrial 
conflicts were evident to any citizen. Unions had the power to break the government, as 
Ted Heath called an election in 1974 with the slogan “Who Governs Britain?” aimed 
against the unions; the answer was not what Heath was seeking.  
 However, unions’ power was to be short-lived. 1970s did not prove to be a 
stepping-stone towards a more egalitarian future – their strength was at its zenith, only to 
wane in the wake of radical Thatcherite assaults. As was the case with social policies, the 
conditions for Thatcherism’s success in devastating the unions were created by the failure 
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of the Labour visions of political economy and industrial relations. The Wilson-
Callaghan government’s incomes policy was mostly based on extracting sacrifices from 
labor rather than capital, curtailing labor’s power for the sake of stability; the Labour 
government’s course in incomes policy was founded upon the acceptance of basic 
capitalist assumptions in which capital’s rate of profit is a primary, inviolable concern. 
Unions were robust enough to wage strikes and bring the existing system to a halt, but 
unable to construct a new regime based on a “fundamental and irreversible” power shift 
towards workers; the seventies ended in stalemate, which opened a way for Thatcherism.  
In this chapter, I demonstrate how unions’ organizational structures, collective 
barganing processes and the ideas held by them influenced the direction of British 
politics and the regime of its political economy. Firstly, I describe the trajectory of British 
industrial relations in the 1960s and 70s, with an emphasis on union actions and the 
Labour governments’ policies. In particular incomes policy, in whose rise and fall trade 
unions played an decisive role, was at the heart of politics of employment and inflation 
that consumed the British seventies. In the critical years of 1974-79, both the government 
policy and the trade union (re)actions were inadequate in constructing a durable system 
of industrial relations, which was “in a fundamental sense… a failure.”232 After I describe 
the events of the seventies, I analyze the mechanism of the failure of an alternative, more 
coordinated form of political economy. While the direct cause of the breakdown is the 
Labour government’s proto-monetarist economic policies which betrayed their “contract” 
with unions, the antipathy among unions against any form of governmental intervention 
and their attachment to decentralized collective bargaining structures precluded a 
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possibility of a labor-friendly form of the Social Contract. I also analyze the productivist 
and masculinist ideas in trade unionism, which rendered it difficult to envision and 
pursue a comprehensive alternative beyond resistance to the wage restraint. 
 
The Politics of Corporatism and Decentralization  
 The traditional system of industrial relations in Britain, which was most stable in 
the 1950s, could be characterized as “collective laissez-faire,” based on the absence of 
elaborate state mechanism beyond judicial immunity for trade unions. The relative calm 
of “industrial Butskellism”233 in the 1950s gave way to a more contested industrial 
relations in the 1960s, following the mounting crisis narratives based on productivist 
concerns with the growth rate slower than other industrialized countries. The 
Conservative government began wage control in 1961, and launched an experiment 
towards corporatism the next year by establishing the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC), which sought to build a comprehensive economic strategy including 
the incomes policy. After Labour’s assumption of power in 1964, they continued the 
broadly corporatist approach of their predecessors. The Labour government was able to 
successfully persuade the TUC to sign the “Joint Statement” with the CBI as a framework 
for voluntary incomes policy, and the government established the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes (NBPI) in 1965 to issue recommendations for voluntary incomes 
policy.234 However, the “indicative norm” for wage growth in line with productivity 
growth proved to be hardly effective, and the government took measures in 1966 to 
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strengthen the NBPI by giving them statutory powers to gather information, summon 
witness and compel advance notification of pay increases.235 While James Callaghan’s 
insistence on fully mandatory incomes policy was rejected by the Cabinet, the Labour 
government was moving towards an enhanced role of the state in industrial relations in 
order to stimulate productivity. The austerity measures in July 1966 were successful in 
curbing wage growth for one year, but they led to the intensified industrial conflicts and 
their effects were canceled by the growing wage explosions in the following years.236 
 Frustrated by the lack of success in incomes policy, the Labour government 
became increasingly concerned with structural reform of industrial relations. One of the 
primary causes of the failure of income restraint was a decentralized structure of 
industrial relations which enabled local wage drift that escaped the control of the TUC at 
the national level.237 Decentralization of collective bargaining was accelerating, due to 
the increased strength of shop stewards based on favorable labor market conditions. 
Furthermore, a wave of corporate mergers created capital-intensive firms with 
concentrated ownership structures that wished to restructure the production processes to 
increase productivity through bargaining at the firm-level; most of them were the foreign-
owned firms outside of the industry bargaining agreement.238 Concerned with 
disintegration of the old system of industry-level bargaining with a new coherent regime 
yet to emerge, the Labour Government convened the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations in 1965, chaired by Lord Donovan. The Donovan 
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Commission’s report, published in 1968, described the “two systems of industrial 
relations” in Britain, in which the formal, industry-level bargaining became increasingly 
minimalistic and irrelevant in the face of “largely informal, largely fragmented and 
largely autonomous” workplace bargaining that caused wage drift.239 The Donovan report 
did not attempt to halt and reverse the decentralizing trend. It was particularly influenced 
by the “Oxford School” of industrial relations represented by Hugh Clegg in the 
Commission, who located the causes of wage drift, “restrictive practices” and industrial 
instabilities in the inadequecy of collective bargaining structures rather than unions’ 
excessive legal immunities.240 As such, they advocated for the creation of firm-level 
bargaining institutions in order to achieve “a reconstruction of voluntary collective 
bargaining.”241 As the Donovan Report proposed few substantial legislative agendas, both 
TUC and CBI, still committed to the basic notions of collective laissez-faire, welcomed 
the Report.242 
 Nonetheless, for many in the Labour government seeking more far-reaching 
measures and a greater role of the state in industrial relations, the Donovan Report was 
far from adequate. As the strike wave intensified, the sense of urgency to take 
governmental measures pervaded; the Cabinet Committee chaired by Employment 
Secretary Barbara Castle concluded that “we would never get anything positive out of the 
TUC and the Government would have to risk giving a lead.”243 A passionate believer in 
the state’s role in industrial relations, Castle took a lead and submitted the intensely 
controversial White Paper in January 1969, titled “In Place of Strife.” Asserting that “the 
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need for State intervention and involvement, in association with both sides of industry, is 
now admitted by almost everyone,” In Place of Strife proposed to establish legal rights, 
obligations and formal procedures for trade unions. It included the legal right to join a 
trade union, procedure of union recognition in cases of employer refusal, and legal 
protection from unfair dismissal.244 However, it also contained restrictions on unions’ 
exercise of power, in particular unofficial strikes which were on rise; the government 
would be able to order a compulsory ballot for official strikes, impose a twenty-eight day 
“cooling off” period for unofficial strikes during which workers would not be allowed to 
strike, and have the power to intervene in inter-union disputes.245 These proposals could 
be considered as fairly modest, considering that they preserved legal immunities for 
unofficial strikes for the most part and rejected legal enforcement of collective bargaining. 
Wilson solidly backed the Castle’s proposals and proposed a bill based upon In Place of 
Strife, but it met strident opposition from trade unions as well as many Labour ministers 
and MPs; as the bill failed to pass, it had no direct impact on the British industrial 
relations.  
Despite its eventual outcome, however, the heated debate over In Place of Strife 
that deeply divided the Labour Party illuminates the dynamics of the contestations of 
principles within labor politics between a more coordinated economy and traditional 
collective laissez-faire. The debates surrounding the White Paper were fundamentally 
about the relationship between trade unionism and the state, and represented “one of 
those rare moments of historical fluidity, in which an alternative direction was 
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possible.”246 Castle was motivated by “the principle of a genuine prices and incomes 
policy”, because she thought it was not “possible to plan the economy without controlling 
demand, of which wage demands form a key part.”247 For Castle, incomes policy was a 
necessary step towards socialism or even a social democracy, and In Place of Strife was 
conceived in the same logic. “I was convinced that Nye [Bevan] would have been on my 
side,” she recalls, following Bevan’s criticism of the “consequences of [trade unions’] 
anarchy.”248 Castle argued that it was “first and foremost a charter of trade union rights,” 
and indeed it contained new statutory rights for them.249  
The intensity of opposition to the Castle’s White Paper from most trade unionists 
was strongly and directly motivated by their voluntarist ideology. For them, any attempt 
for corporatist macroeconomic management was an anathema to their principles and 
identity. Overwhelming and ferocious union oppositions were carried into the party by 
rightist figures such as Callaghan as well as the left-leaning Tribune group, which vowed 
to fight against the “declaration of war on trade unions.”250 
It is not entirely clear that In Place of Strife was a losing proposition for union 
interests. Indeed, the lack of the legal rights contributed to the particularly extensive and 
deep damage that Thatcher was able to inflict on the unions, against which the “charter of 
trade union rights” could arguably have provided some protections. Their determined and 
inflexible approach to the Castle-style policies was primarily shaped by their beliefs on 
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their interests and ideals, rather than by an “objective” set of interests. Class identity was 
implicated in the voluntarist ideas, defined as working-class autonomy from 
encroachment of the (predominantly middle-class) politicians in the government, which 
are clearly indicated in Jack Jones’ comment on Castle; “I found her anxious to do things 
for the workers but not with them. Her outlook was not all that unusual in politicians of 
the Left.”251 However, any project to shift class power towards workers requires initiative 
of the state, as it cannot be done solely through reactive actions such as militant strikes.  
However, on the other hand, the unions’ scepticism of the state initiatives were 
understandably fueled by the Labour government’s lack of priorities given to interests 
and power of the workers vis-à-vis capital. The logic of In Place of Strife was attribution 
of low productivity and inflationary tendencies to unions’ confrontational stances and 
frequent strikes, which had capital-friendly bias that also permeated their incomes policy. 
Indeed, she was explicit about her intent to control and limit strikes, to ensure the 
government be made “effectively their [unions’] prisoner.”252 Even though she thought 
that “we ought to strengthen unions not weaken them” and rejected the CBI call for 
legally enforceable collective bargaining, unions had reasons to be concerned. 
Furthermore, not only the were restrictions on union activities in the Castle paper real, 
she lacked the vision of an alternative leftist political economy beyond the management 
of productivity through prevention of wildcat strikes and price stability through incomes 
policy. She argued that unions “disliked wage restraint, but could not think of an 
alternative”; but neither could she, as the Labour government’s incomes policy and 
economic planning as a whole were characterized by continuity from the preceding 
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Conservative government rather than rupture.253 Even though Labour ministers 
emphasized that growth would benefit living standards of workers, the liberatory causes 
were unambiguously secondary to the conventional macroeconomic management that 
had to prioritize capitalist interests. The unions rightly took notice of the “growing 
evidence from the political sphere that any legislation was likely to have a large punitive 
component.”254 Labour subscribed to the productivist narrative of decline to an even 
greater extent than the Tories did, as they defined themselves as the champion of growth 
with the modernist “white heat of technology”; their moderate stances were due to the 
utmost priority given to productivist ideas. While they were able to secure unions’ 
cooperation for most aspects of their agenda due to the unions’ desire to aid them in 
government, their support was often weak and grudging. The government’s moderatism 
discredited the entire logic of coordinated economy through the state as part of worker-
friendly policies. 
Attempts to expand the role of state and coordinations could not attract workers’ 
support because they were not primarily designed to enhance the workers’ power, and 
gave justifications for unions’ voluntarism, which in turn rendered difficult the pro-labor 
restructuing of industrial relations in a corporatist or a statist manner. This toxic dynamic 
of moderatism and volutarism between the Labour Party in government and the unions 
closed the spaces for developing an alternative, co-ordinated and worker-friendly regime 
of industrial relations and political economy, with important implications for the 
following decade. In other words, both In Place of Strife and its reactions presaged the 
failure of alternatives in the seventies.  
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Rise and Fall of the Social Contract 
After the lackluster six years in government, Labour unexpectedly lost an election 
in June 1970. But as the Labour Party lost power, trade unions were gaining more. They 
continued to mount strikes, more of which involved official strikes from 1970; union 
leaders were more often leading strikes rather than attempting to tame the wildcat 
actions.255 Workers in diverse sectors that had not been striking for a long period, in 
particular public workers including teachers and nurses, began to take industrial actions; 
the enhanced power of the unions attracted a large number of new members, which 
further strengthened them. Labor militancy was fueled by the Industrial Relations Act 
(IRA) enacted by the Conservative government in 1971; IRA entirely repealed the union 
immunity guaranteed in the Trade Disputes Act of 1906, imposed constraints upon a 
range of types of strikes and instituted the strike-prohibiting “cooling-off” period of sixty 
days. IRA included the basic logic of the In Place of Strife, namely the restrictions on 
strikes in return for statutory recognition and rights for unions, but the Tory legislation 
was expectedly far more antagonistic towards unions. TUC’s extensive campaign 
effectively mobilized workers. They organized one-day national strikes and instructed its 
member unions to refuse cooperation by not registering themselves under the legislation; 
most unions followed the TUC leadership and the systemic union refusal to comply with 
the act rendered it nonoperational. 256  Even employers were not committed enough to 
utilize the provisions of the act for fear of risking intensified industrial conflict. The 
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emergency powers the IRA gave the state did not withstand the miners’ strike in 1972, 
which shattered its intention to pacify the industrial relations. 
The vibrant unionism infused positive energy to the disappointment and 
discontent brewing in the Labour Party with the failure of the first Wilson government, 
and created a force for change in the party. Labour Left was ascendent in the party’s 
policy-making bodies and the Annual Conference, driven both by a new generation of 
radical union leaders as well as the New Left-influenced party activists in the 
constituency parties, enabling the leftward shift in the party on a scale unseen since 
1931.257 Even though the party’s parliamentary leadership and the Shadow Cabinet 
scarcely changed, they were compeled to forge a closer relationship with the unions, 
which was badly damaged during the In Place of Strife controversy. TUC and the party 
formed a Liaison Committee to coordinate economic policies, which produced a joint 
statement in February 1973 (“Statement on Economic Policy and the Cost of Living”) 
that was the beginning of the “Social Contract.” The statement included price controls 
(particularly on food), steeply progressive taxation, rise in pensions at a rate tied with the 
level of wage increases, expansion of investment through public ownership and control of 
private capital flight, and the extension of industrial democracy.258 Labour Programme 
for Britain, which was adopted at the 1973 Annual Conference and became the basis of 
the manifesto for the 1974 elections, followed the Liaison Committee statement and 
emphasized the extension of public ownership even to a greater degree; even the public 
ownership of twenty-five largest private companies in Britain came very close to 
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adoption at the Conference.259 The party manifestoes famously and proudly called for “a 
fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power and wealth in favour of 
working people”; Jones appealed to idealistic imaginations by speaking of the “new 
Jerusalem” that Labour would create.260 Harold Wilson promoted the Social Contract as 
indispensable for economic recovery, and pledged the party that the agreement would not 
“deal with inflation and unemployment except on the basis of social justice.”261  
Labour won the February 1974 election, but with a minority government. In the 
beginning of their term, their policies reflected the spirit of the manifesto’s commitment 
to a certain extent, with a budget that included steeper progressive tax and increase in 
social spending and public sector wages.262 Labor-friendly industrial relatons policy was 
the core of the government’s promise to the unions in the Social Contract. The IRA was 
entirely repealed soon after Labour took the government back, and major legislation on 
workplace safety and equal pay followed. The government also took a step towards legal 
protection of unions by enacting Employment Protection Act (EPA) in 1975, which 
established a statutory right to union recognition.263 EPA further sought to empower 
unions inside the workplaces by granting shop stewards rights at the firm level, such as 
the days off to engage in union activities and resources for training; Jack Jones described 
it as a “shop stewards’ charter.”264 However, while these legislations undoubtedly had 
important positive aspects for unions, they were also inadequate; the scope of new 
statutory rights was very limited, and no positive right to strike was legislated since it was 
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not even contemplated by the unions or by the government.265 The authority given to the 
newly-created agency to enforce statutory recognition of unions was often too weak to 
force employers to recognize unions, as demonstrated in the Grunwick case where 
workers failed to win union recognition after high-profile and protracted struggles.266  
These pro-labor policies, however imperfect, were the key to securing unions’ 
cooperation in wage restraint, which “had been the ‘unmentionable’ of the original Social 
Contract” in the heady idealistic days as an opposition.267 The issue of wage demands 
became prominent in the continuously slow-growing economy and high inflation, but the 
Labour government was determined to avoid statutory incomes policy, and sought to win 
a commitment to voluntary wage control from the unions; indeed, they emphasized that 
their special relationship with the unions made them uniquely capable of providing 
industrial peace. In June 1974, the government and the TUC agreed on an informal 
guideline in which unions were asked to refrain from wage demands that would result in 
real income increase, meaning that the wages were not to rise faster than the increase in 
cost of living. While the agreement was contentious in the TUC, it was approved at their 
Congress in September 1974, as they found it important to support the government that 
was at that time fulfilling its commitments to them. Jack Jones, as a leader of the largest 
union as well as a figure with leftist credentials, was a crucial advocate of the wage 
agreements as part of the Social Contract. The TUC officially stated its official 
opposition to the wage settlements outside the guideline, but many constituent unions 
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refused to comply. By December 1974, the wages increased by 25.3% in the past twelve 
month while price levels rose by 19% in the same period; the rapid wage increases 
continued in early 1975, when many large unions, including civil servants, miners and 
gas workers, negotiated around 30% increases.268 
Inflation created the (perception of) deepening crisis that boosted the discourses 
of government incompetence as well as unions’ greed and irresponsibility; the 
government was rapidly becoming anxious to take more effective and direct measures to 
restrain wage increases. Hence, the leading ministers became publicly hostile to union 
militancy by the late 1974; as Prime Minister Wilson put it, unions were “trying to seize 
more than their share of what is available.”269 The government started to take tougher 
positions against public-sector unions, and urged the TUC to agree to a voluntary yet 
formal incomes policy in July 1975, which restricted the pay increases to £6 per week for 
twelve months regardless of the inflation rate. Fearful of the threat of statutory incomes 
policy and the potential collapse of the still-fragile Labour government (they only gained 
the parliamentary majority of three after the October 1974 election), the TUC fully 
backed the new wage restraint with a massive margin in the September 1975 Congress.270 
Their vigilant monitoring of the member unions’ compliance reduced the wage increases 
to 13.9% in the July 1975-76 period, which was lower than the inflation rate.271  
As the incomes policy became more demanding of the workers, the government 
also retreated from its commitments to shift the balance of power to working people, let 
alone in a “fundamental and irreversible” way. As early as in November 1974, merely a 
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month after they secured a parliamentary majority, they retreated from controls on private 
firms and prices and started to reduce public expenditure by sacrificing scale and quality 
of social services; the social wage was sacrificed due to the priority they gave to 
bolstering the profit levels of private manufacturing firms. The shift was slight yet 
sufficiently distinct to constitute a U-turn from the earlier budgets in March and July 
1974.272 The government departure from the spirit, if not the letter, of the transformative 
manifesto undermined the core principle of the Social Contract, in which “wage restraint 
was the quid pro quo for genuine social reform and not, as it had been in the past, merely 
a device to fight inflation.”273 The Left was strong in the Labour Party’s constituency 
committees composed of grassroots activists and increasingly in major unions. While 
they often had the majority in the Annual Conferences, where they were able to pass the 
1973 program, the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Cabinet were not accountable to 
the Conference decisions or the party base.  
It was the self-sacrifice of the TUC that sustained the incomes policy despite the 
government’s lack of comparable commitment to them; even Healey recognized their 
extraordinary contributions by remarking that “I do not think there has been any previous 
occasion in history… in which the trade union movement of its own will… has agreed 
[to] it in very great detail.”274 However, the unions gradually lost patience with the ever-
increasing demand for the decrease in real wages without anything in return. The stage 
two of the incomes policy starting in the summer of 1976 was also, quite remarkably, 
accepted by the TUC and implememted without the official challenges – the pay 
increases were limited to 5% in the nominal rate, even as the inflation rate continued to 
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soar above 15%.275 The grassroots discontent mounted, amidst further drastic cuts in 
public expenditure following the government acceptance of the IMF bailout in December 
1976. The government’s argument that the wage restraints were an alternative to high 
unemployment lost persuasive power as the unemployment rate failed to decline, and 
TUC members overwhelmingly backed the motion to return to free collective bargaining 
by the following year at the September 1976 Congress.276 TUC leaders warned the 
government against renewal of pay policy in the 1977-78 period, and they began to 
publicly condemn the government by early 1977. Anticipating the union reaction, the 
government was prepared to unilaterally attempt to hold pay rises below 10% in 1977-78, 
through the negotiations with the public-sector unions and sanctions on private firms that 
signed an agreement exceeding the target. The TUC Congress in 1977 again called for 
“an orderly return to free collective bargaining” based on the “reject[ion of] the theory 
that wage rises are a major contributing factor towards inflation.”277 Union leaders 
nonetheless agreed to apply the 5% limit to the agreements signed before July 1977 even 
where they would apply after the expiration of the stage two, and urged members against 
“self-defeating” large demands to compensate for the lost portion over the past three 
years; the wage increase was limited to 14.2% as inflation rate began to decline.278 
Frustrated by the unstable annual negotiations of pay restraints and boosted by the 
reduction in inflation achieved in 1977-78, the Labour government sought to establish a 
permanent rule for the wage limits and to further tighten the limit to annual nominal 
increase of 5%. Understandably, all TUC leaders instantly rejected the new stage and 
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again called for the restoration of free collective bargaining at the September 1978 
Congress, and they were even successful in rejecting the government plan at the Labour 
Party conference in October with the weight of their bloc votes.279 Ultimately, it was the 
grassroots disaffection and militancy that brought down the entire edifice of the incomes 
policy, culminating in the (in)famous “Winter of Discontent” in early 1979. Ford workers 
succeeded in winning the 17% raise after nine weeks of strikes in late 1978, which set a 
standard for other firms; 1.5 million public workers participated in the strategically-
coordinated strikes that brought a great disruption in the economy in the winter of 1979. 
The Winter of Discontent put an end to Britain’s corporatist experiment, and the Labour 
government was defeated by the Thatcher-led Conservatives in May 1979.  
It was after the collapse of the Callaghan government in 1979, having witnessed 
the reality of Thatcherism, that the Labour Left again gained ascendency. Outraged by 
the party’s parliamentary leadership’s disregard of the party’s opinions, the campaign for 
intra-party democracy was successful in passing accountability measures such as 
mandatory reselection of MPs at each election. The exploration of an alternative strategy 
on the Left also gained momentum, coalescing around the Alternative Economic Strategy 
(AES). The election of left-leaning Michael Foot to the party leadership as a 
“compromise” candidate in 1980 paved a way to the 1983 manifesto, which incorporated 
many leftist proposals including public control of investment capital and reflation of the 
economy through public expenditure. However, the renewed leftist momentum never saw 
the party in government again; Labour faced an electoral disaster in 1983, due to many 
factors including the formation of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) by the defecting 
Labour Right in 1981, improvements in the world economy that bolstered Thatcher’s 
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credentials and the successful Falklands War; the Liberal-SDP Alliance gained almost the 
same proportion of votes as Labour, squarely splitting the anti-Thatcher votes.280 The 
left-wing manifesto was widely seen as the cause of Labour’s defeat; therefore, their 
electoral failure in the 1983 profoundly discredited the Labour Left projects, whose 
wounds have not been healed even today. 
 
Contradictions of the Social Contract 
A multitude of reasons have been offered for the eventual failure of the 1974-79 
Labour government. The definition or even the assessment of “failure” itself is contested; 
indeed, some scholars note that the government was not a failure in terms of the 
economic indicators it achieved at the end, especially considering the difficult global 
economic environment.281 Nonetheless, the common perception of the government as a 
failure caused their loss of the position in government in 1979. In the hegemonic 
interpretation, their fate was triggered by the unions that were “irresponsibly” exercising 
their “excessive” power that needed to be curtailed by Thatcher; undoubtedly, the 
dominant media’s descriptions of the events of Winter 1979 contributed to the outcome 
of the 1979 election. If the electoral defeat can in itself be seen as a sign of failure, 
Callaghan’s strategic miscalculations not to call an election in the autumn of 1978 could 
also be blamed - as Labour was a few points ahead in the opinion polls, they could have 
won an election in 1978. Had they won, the new Labour government would have 
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benefitted from the North Sea Oil revenue worth tens of billions of pounds, which were 
wasted to finance Thatcher’s tax cuts.  
The historical significance of the 1979 election was that it caused the victory of 
the rightist responses to the turnoils of the seventies. However, such structural change 
cannot be, in the final instance, attributed to a few particular events such as the non-
election in 1978 or even the industrial actions in the winter of 1979, which were a 
manifestation and culmination of the failure of the Social Contract. To an extent that the 
1974-79 government can be seen as having failed, it is due to the eventual collapse of the 
institution and the idea of the Social Contract, a vision of a coordinated economy led by 
the Labour Government and unions based on their institutional and ideological 
connections. Ideological aversion to coordination especially among unions and the lack 
of institutional mechanisms for coordination deprived them of the tool to construct an 
alternative. Pervasive moderatism on both sides, attributable to the lack of egalitarian 
idealism, deprived them of the motivations to use the Social Contract for anything 
beyond temporary damage control. 
The acceptance of the hegemonic capitalist assumptions – rejection of the public 
ownership of means of production as a solution - by the Cabinet majority including 
Wilson, Callaghan and Healey was directly and primarily responsible for the proto-
monetarist course that eventually destroyed the Social Contract. The party leaders’ 
decidedly pro-capitalist view rendered it impossible for them to introduce any policy that 
actually shifts the balance of power to working people, which is, almost by definition, 
bound to reduce the rate of profit; Healey’s claim that “the Government must live with 
the judgments of the market, whether they like them or not” is indicative of the ideational 
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constraints on their options.282 The lack of emancipatory idealism was the basic reason 
why they could not offer the unions quid pro quo for wage restraint, which by itself 
undermined the notion of real Social Contract in which both sides would benefit. The 
responsibility of the collapse of the Social Contract rests squarely with the government 
and not the unions, since the government breached a commitment on their part that social 
services would not be cut if the unions adhered to the incomes policy.283 The moderate 
ideational tendency of the Labour government leaders directly made them let go of the 
“possibility, in designing industrial and social strategy, of harnessing this industrial 
militancy for radical political ends.”284  
The collapse of the Social Contract was of a path-determining significance, 
because the structural flaws of Keynesianism is that it contains no mechanism to deal 
with inflation and balance-of-payments issues on its own. To maintain full employment 
without causing high levels of inflation or unsustainable currency depreciation, some 
kinds of corporatist coordinations are necessary. In the “stop-go” cycle of British postwar 
economic policy, the periods of expansion led to higher inflation rate and/or worsening of 
balance-of-payments, precipitating the “stop” cycle; it is “the British experience during 
the crisis-free postwar decades [that] illustrates this fundamental weakness of a purely 
statist Keynesianism,” which “collapsed in Britain as much for political and economic 
reasons.”285 The rationale of the incomes policy, which began in a limited sense in 1961, 
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was to maintain full employment without causing problems of high inflation or balance 
of payments.286 In a low-growth economy without the benefit of sustained long-term 
growth, the imperatives for coordination are even starker. The eventual failure of the 
coordinated incomes policy was the cause and the consequence of the failure of the 
durable system of industrial relations in the 1970s, which discredited the Keynesian or 
any non-neoliberal, egalitarian settlements. 
The social democratic model that requires coordination is a precondition for post-
productivist or the social wage economy. Dissociation of wage-work with income or the 
egalitarian distribution of work and livelihood, especially those that don’t require fast 
growth, cannot be achieved without extensive coordination of strenghthened labor with 
capital and the state, at least before the commanding heights of the economy are in the 
public hand. As Andrew Glyn notes, “greater hours reductions and increases in state 
employment [as]… the response to slower growth” only occurred in a corporatist system, 
Sweden being the most archetypal example.287 While incomes policy in most cases (and 
certainly so in Britain) emphasizes the sacrifices for workers in the form of wage restraint, 
a coordinated political economy is not more prone to a higher rate of exploitation, which 
depends on the balance of class forces. If the level of immediate consumption vis-à-vis 
investment is not to be too high, it is necessary to further institute a coordinated system in 
which savings can be made without increasing the share accured to capital, such as the 
wage-earner fund.  
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Beyond the moderate, fundamentally capitalist assumptions held by the party and 
unions, ideational influences of voluntarism, productivism and masculinism functioned 
negatively for the prospect of such a transformative project. The masculinist and 
productivist values dominant in trade unionism, tied together with voluntarism, offer one 
important explanation for the reasons why “trade unions had failed to respond to the 
economic crisis of the 1970s with any strategic reassessment, relying instead on a 
schizophrenic oscillation between strike action and political incorporation.”288 The 
preoccupation with independence from the state and relative lack of robust central 
organization hindered their capacity to utilize the crisis as an opportunity in a strategic 
and political manner, and obstructed the effective and timely development of a 
comprehensive alternative for wide-scale transformations, only with which they could 
escape the default capitalist solution of Callaghanean proto-neoliberalism and incomes 
policy that relied more on sacrifices from labor. Contrary to the popular perception of 
excessively powerful unions in the seventies, their power was primarily reactive; they 
were “veto players” able to resist new policies through industrial actions, but not to 
initiate new policy regimes.  
 
The Ideology and Institution of Free Collective Bargaining  
The ideology of state non-interference coupled with the values associated with 
decentralization made it difficult, if not impossible, to construct an organized system of 
managing the economy. Peter Hall notes that even though “the British trade union 
movement [was] powerful enough to create strong inflationary pressures, it was also 
organizationally fragmented enough to render neocorporatist solutions to the problems of 
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unemployment and inflation, of the sort associated with incomes policies, especially 
difficult to attain.”289 Fritz Scharpf concurs and emphasizes that “in Great Britain the 
unions were ultimately unable to restrain wages for institutional reasons.”290 Desmond 
King and Stuart Wood argue that neoliberalism was a result of the “alliance or natural 
affinity between the functional requirements and organization of Anglo-American market 
economies and the political goals of right-of-center parties in power”, referring to the 
lack of corporatist coordination even before 1979.291 Even though Britain before 1979 
was not a liberal market economy per se, collective bargaining structures’ lack of 
coordination with macroeconomic policies contained the seed of affinity with 
neoliberalism.  
To note such structural affinities needs not be an affirmation of a deterministic 
account of the rise of Thatcherism, which could be interpreted as “a post hoc justification 
of the neo-liberal experiment after 1979.”292 The reason of the failure of “a path toward a 
more coordinated, even planned economy” that looked plausible cannot be solely 
attributed to institutional path dependence, considering the intense political conflicts of 
the 1970s.293 It was rather also a case of ideational path dependence; the entrenchment of 
these institutional patterns was deeply entangled with the ideas associated with these 
institutions. The lack of coordinating mechanisms due to organizational fragmentation 
and the ideology of voluntaristic “free” collective bargaining deeply rooted in the British 
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union movements dialectically reinforced each other. The origin of the traditional British 
collective laissez-faire can be traced back to Trade Disputes Act of 1906 which 
guaranteed blanket immunity for union actions in furtherance of a trade dispute, and 
prevented the use of labor injunctions by employers to stop strikes. The 1906 Act was 
prompted in response to the Taff Vale decision by the High Court in 1901, which deemed 
that unions could be liable in tort for financial damages caused by strike actions, 
effectively eliminating their right to strike. While collective laissez-faire allowed the 
unions to exercise the maximum power they could muster, they would lose legal recourse 
to force employer recognition of the unions and the labor contracts through the state. The 
1906 legislation precluded an alternative system of industrial relations based on 
compulsory arbitation, the right to union recognition and restrictions on strike; this model 
was pioneered in the New Zealand legislation in 1894, and soon adopted in Australia and 
Canada. In Britain, the 1894 report of the Royal Commission on Labour had already 
articulated the principles of voluntarism along the lines of collective laissez-faire, and its 
institutional stability over the decades could be attributed to the broad political consensus 
among capital, labor and the state which originated in the 1894 report. The strong distrust 
of the state engendered by Taff Vale was an important ideational factor that induced the 
majority of the labor movement to support collective laissez-faire and reject the stronger 
role of the state and the positive rights, whose guarantee by the courts they did not trust; 
the Trade Disputes Act (enacted by the Liberal government as an agreement with the 
newly-established Labour Party) was crucial in entrenching the anti-statist ideational path 
of the labor movement.  
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Collective laissez-faire was entrenched as a fundamental principle in British 
industrial relations until it began to be seriously contested in the 1960s, in which the rise 
of new industrial relations regime accelerated decentralization. Following the Donovan 
Report, the Labour government sought to strengthen collective bargaining frameworks at 
the firm level through the Employment Protection Act. However, the logic of industrial 
relations policy promoting decentralized union structures posed an internal contradiction 
in the Social Contract by weakening the capacity of the state, unions and corporations to 
control wages, contributing to the demise of the incomes policy in 1978.294  
 Unions’ historically-derived conviction for state non-interference developed a life 
of its own and into a “myth of bootstrap voluntarism,” the idea that “unions have lifted 
themselves into their present position of power and influence by their own unaided 
efforts in overcoming employer resistance and hostile social forces.”295 The TUC 
submission to the Donovan Commission demonstrates their voluntarist positions, which 
are an explanation of British union history and a normative position at the same time; 
they argued that “trade unions have not been given privileges; they have fought for what 
they have achieved” and that it is “one of the most important factors sustaining their 
strength and independence”, and “trade union strength has been developed without the 
help of any external agency” especially “the assistance of Government through 
legislation.”296 Such a formulation certainly exaggerated their own strength; the 
employers’ recognition of unions was often motivated by their own interest to secure 
managerial control and labor peace, rather than a direct consequence of the strength of 
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the unions.297 Furthermore, the state had created conditions conducive to collective 
bargaining through labor laws that “assigned primacy to collective bargaining” by 
insulating them from the judge-made common law, such as the establishment of the Joint 
Industrial Council to facilitate continuously collective bargaining at an industry-level, 
and the 1959 legislation that eased extension procedure of collective bargaining 
contracts.298  
 These institutional conditions fostered an ideational foundation of “a decided 
preference” for voluntary collective laissez-faire among all concerned parties, which was 
entrenched enough to be “part of a general British cultural heritage in industrial relations” 
until the 1960s and starkly manifested in opposition to In Place of Strife.299 The unions’ 
commitment to the voluntaristic regime was continuously self-entrenched through their 
practice. For example, the successes of the voluntarist industrial relations in mobilization 
for the World War II gave a new impetus to the union’s support for collective laissez-
faire, originally ignited by their antagonism towards the judiciary in the Edwardian era. 
Most importantly, as the unions gained unprecedented structural power in the postwar 
Keynesian economy with full employment, “bootstrap voluntarism” gained certain 
validation. As such, a devotion to the voluntary system became the strongest common 
ideology shared by the trade unions by the 1970s. Their ideational attachment to “free” 
collective bargaining was so strong that the TUC requested no positive legislation to the 
Donovan Commission, as nearly 90% of the TUC unions in 1965 were even reluctant to 
support a legislation against wrongful dismissal.300 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
297	  Flanders,	  “the	  Tradition	  of	  Voluntarism,”	  355.	  
298	  Howell,	  Trade	  Unions,	  86,	  71,	  91.	  
299	  Flanders,	  “the	  Tradition	  of	  Voluntarism,”	  362,	  355.	  
300	  Ibid.,	  	  
	   122	  
While the regime of collective laissez-faire in industrial relations is hardly 
equivalent to the mid-nineteenth century market society, it shared certain basic 
characteristics with laissez-faire in a original sense. In colletive laissez-faire as in simple 
laissez-faire, the structural power of each actor in the market is the sole determinent of 
the extent of their freedom. In collective laissez-faire, the unions must solely rely on their 
own economic strength through organization, whose deployment is only enabled by legal 
immunities, as they do not provide positive rights to protect them from the economic 
power of capitalists. The ideology of voluntarism created a “false sense of security” and 
the “fail[ure] to recognize the dangers posed by a withdrawral of state support for trade 
unionism and collective bargaining” led to their significant vulnerablity in the face of 
Thatcherite attacks, as favorable economic conditions for unions, created by political 
Keynesianism, began to dissipate.301 Voluntarism did not only weaken their capacity for 
resistance in the face of weakening their market-based power; combined with other 
ideologies, it served to preclude a transition towards emancipatory alternatives. Also, the 
laissez-faire aspect of voluntarism means that it does not work for the most powerless; by 
upholding the differentials among workers, the claim for free collective bargaining 
perpetuated the existing power differentials and promoted the preference of the powerful 
within the labor movements.  
 The values of shop-floor culture based on the historical strength of shop steward 
organizations in British unions were also influential. Institutionally speaking, the 
structure of voluntarist collective laissez-faire necessarily left a wider scope for the firm-
level negotiations and conflicts even in the era of industry-level bargaining, since 
industry-level collective agreements were legally unenforceable; just as union federations 
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were free from the legislations, workers in workplaces were free from industry-level 
bargaining in Britain, which was significantly different from bargaining in most of the 
continental Europe. Fiercely independent and concerned with autonomy in work, the 
cultural discourses commonly practiced by shop stewards were also crucial for generating 
workers’ solidarity and oppositional consciousness against employers and managers. As 
self-control of the workplace free from managerial control comprised a crucial aspect of 
the values of independence, the shop-floor tradition was instrumental in protecting British 
workers from Taylorist production processes comparatively successfully well into the 
1960s, creating the “Britain’s flawed version of Fordism.”302 As the management 
attempted to fully introduce Fordism in the era of Keynesian full employment, unions 
were determined to deploy industrial action to protect their prerogatives; the number of 
strikes dramatically rose between 1950 and 1964, and so did the proportion of strikes 
over “working arrangements, rules and disciplines” rather than simple wage issues 
throughout the manufacturing sector.303  
 However, these emancipatory aspects of shop steward voluntarism was combined 
with the “daunting sense of individualism deep in commonsense of trade unionism” 
which resulted in an instrumental form of collectivism.304 Not only are such 
decentralizing, anti-statist tendencies antipathetic to the functioning of a coordinated 
political economy, the voluntarist ethos undermined the unions’ and their members’ 
commitment to struggle for comprehensive political solutions. Transformative projects of 
political economy require a massive and united agent committed to its pursuit; for strong 
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trade unions with capacities of industrial action to fulfill the role, actions need to be 
coordinated around a united set of political demands rather than using their strength 
mainly to demand wage increases for a particular segment of the working class.  
 
Industrial Democracy or Economism?  
 As the voluntarist ethos entailed the defense of workers’ autonomy, British unions’ 
shop steward tradition also spawned the call for industrial democracy. As labor gained 
strength, the call for a qualitative advance of labor rights became more vocal. Since 
collective regulations began spreading in its scope and vertically to the workplaces, 
industrial democracy also “fit the economic logic of the [emerging] system of industrial 
relations.”305 For the workers, the increased scope of bargaining beyond pay into 
workplace issues opened a path towards industrial democracy within the firms; the 
previous system of industry-level bargaining usually ignored qualitative work issues, 
leaving them up to unilateral determination by the employer or informal negotiations 
without structural support for workers.306 In particular, Jack Jones was a passionate and 
influential advocate for industrial democracy as an agenda integral to the labor 
movement; he had been pressing for it in the party since the early days of the Wilson 
government, and his rise helped the agenda gain prominence.307 He had chaired the 
Labour Party working group on industrial democracy from 1967, and the TUC adopted a 
policy to call for 50% worker representation in boards of directors, modeled after the 
German co-determination system.308 Industrial democracy questioned a fundamental 
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capitalist power of managerial control, and could be a step towards a radical enlargement 
of democratic rights into the sphere of economy that is as significant as the expansion of 
political franchise achieved in the early 20th century.  
 The party’s 1974 manifesto included a commitment to “increase the control of 
industry by the people” and it was one of the major agenda items.309  The newly elected 
Labour government established a Royal Commission to explore the possibilities of 
industrial democracy, chaired by Alan Bullock; however, they stalled an action on the 
private members’ bill on Industrial Democracy introduced by a Labour backbencher.310 
In 1977, the Bullock Commission released a report with a proposal to establish employee 
representation in companies employing 2,000 or more employees in Britain.311 
Approximately a quarter of employees (6-7 million out of 24-25 million) would gain 
employee representation through their unions under the Bullock Report, and though the 
employees would gain as many seats in the board as shareholders, they wouldn’t 
necessarily comprise half of the board since other members can be appointed to the 
board.312 The authority of the board against the management was to be decided by each 
company, and no new structure of participation below the level of board would be 
established unlike in the German model, on the basis that strong shop steward networks 
had sufficiently been established.313 The minority in the Bullock Commission opposed to 
industrial democracy filed their own report, advocating for a “supervisory” board of 
employees that are consulted by, but separate from, the actual board.  
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The movement for industrial democracy was not limited to a simple participation 
of union representatives in corporate boards, as stipulated in the Bullock Report. The 
Lucas Plan, drafted by shop stewards of the Lucas Aerospace in a highly participatory 
process, made a case for far more radical restructuring of industry by taking the social 
implications of production into account. As workers at Lucas faced the company’s plan 
for redundancy, they produced their own alternative plan for the firm. While Lucas was 
primarily producing military equipment, the workers’ plan called for utilizing the 
machinery and skills at Lucas for producing socially useful products such as medical 
supplies, green technologies like solar cells, windmills, and more energy-efficient 
engines.314 As military production was capital intensive, moving away from it would 
preserve jobs while reducing the profit margin. Mike Cooley, one of the leading shop 
stewards at Lucas, argued that the Lucas plan would address some of the central 
contradictions of capitalism, such high unemployment despite the persistence of unmet 
human needs and alienation in production processes.315 The Lucas’ process of worker-led 
“human-centered production” was a plan with radical potential.  
 The Alternative Economic Strategy (AES), a set of Left proposals on 
macroeconomic policy, absorbed the values of the Lucas Plan and incorporated “Planning 
Agreements tied to an extensive network of industrial democracy.”316 AES was 
developed by the Labour Left and sympathetic unionists, and offers the most concrete 
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vision of a possible leftist solution to the seventies’ stalemate, “an economic alternative 
to bring a resolution to the crisis in the interest of the working class.”317 
AES incorporates the Lucas-style workers’ control because it “lies at the heart of… our 
ideas about the life of socialist society,” which is “social liberation… [as] the autonomous 
activity of working people.”318 As a comprehensive policy paradigm, AES builds a 
framework in which the ideas of the Lucas Plan could be adopted throughout the 
economy; it must be based on extensive public ownership of production and finances 
which enable “a national economic plan coordinating macroeconomic policies with 
industrial planning.” They require trade and capital control as preconditions to protect the 
balance of payments and prevent capital flight, and price control to manage inflation.319 
Indeed, socially-useful and human-centered production cannot be prioritized as long as 
investment and production decisions are made to maximize profitability, and any social 
economy in which investment decisions are decoupled from profitability would require 
public ownership and/or control of capital. AES emphasizes that the Lucas-style change 
cannot be sustainably enacted at the micro-level in an isolated manner; it needs to be 
backed by corresponding macroeconomic policies and strengthened organized labor.  
 Neither the AES nor the Lucas Plan was actually implemented. After the five 
years of conservative Labour government and a brief Left ascendency in the party, AES’ 
chance was over when the 1983 manifesto was hegemonically seen as the “longest 
suicide note” for Labour, the main culprit for its dramatic loss. The Lucas Plan found an 
enthusiastic supporter in Tony Benn, but met hostile or indifferent responses from other 
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Labour ministers and many TUC officials. Even the proposals of the Bullock Report, 
which were relatively mild and hardly entailed a transition to socialism, went nowhere; it 
predictably encountered an intense capital opposition in the climate of heightened class 
conflict, and it did not inspire sufficiently enthusiastic support base among labor 
movements to overcome the employer oppositions. Industrial democracy was also 
controversial within unions, as the opposition was mounted by “an unholy alliance 
between advocates of a narrow, economist definition of trade unionism… and fractions of 
the extreme left who feared the class collaborationist overtones of industrial 
democracy.”320 While the TUC continued to advocate for the Bullock report, many 
influential unions were opposed.321 As the unions did not deploy their organizational 
might to pursue industrial democracy, Labour government’s inaction and apathy due to 
their moderate conservatism kept the status quo. Industrial democracy could potentially 
have been a key offering to labor in the Social Contract, which did not function in the end 
because adequate compensations for their acceptance of wage restraints could not be 
offered. 
 Unions’ economism was certainly a dominant force against industrial democracy. 
As their significant bargaining strength was expended mostly to demand higher wages, 
“there was very little plant bargaining on anything other than pay.”322 Unions’ 
decentralizing tradition, which was their own “interpretation of democracy,” was not 
deployed to demand democracy at work, but to demand wage increases in an un-
coordinated way.323 Economism was contradictory to qualitative labor causes, and it was 
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more than a matter of trade unionists reluctant to be directors. The unions’ opposition to 
the alienating process of productivity enhancement and their defense of autonomy 
conflicted with their priorities for rapid wage increases. Indeed, the shop stewards’ 
resistance to Taylorism in the sixties were eroded through productivity agreements, in 
which wage increases were bought at the expense of “removal of restrictive practices.” 
They typically required reduction of overtime, removal of restrictions on production, 
reduction of employed labor power and flexibility in patterns of work.324 By 1969, 
productivity bargaining agreements covered six millions workers, comprising more than 
half of the unionized workforce. However, productivity agreements gradually morphed 
into a losing proposition for workers, as the wage gains proved elusive while restrictive 
practices remained in place. 
 Industrial democracy does not necessarily conflict with the notion of productivity; 
indeed, it was sometimes proposed as a measure to increase productivity through less 
conflictual working environment. The core aim of the AES was faster economic growth 
through planned reflation. However, the notion of human-centered production can often 
conflict with economic growth since it is not its priority, and it is especially contradictory 
with capital accumulation. The real industrial democracy, in which workers not only have 
immediate control over production but also in which it is protected enough from the 
market forces, would not promote growth if workers choose not to prioritize it. The case 
of Volvo’s Uddevalla plant in Sweden illustrates the dilemma. The Uddevalla plant was 
established in 1989 with an explicit aim to improve quality of working experience; not 
only did the Swedish metal workers’ union actively promote it, the strength of Swedish 
labor created a situation in which the firm needed to actively recruit productive workers 
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through such human-centered production.325 Even though the Uddevalla plant proved to 
be at least as profitable as the company’s other plants in Sweden, it could not be as 
competitive as the dominant “Toyotist” lean production, a new variant of Taylorism, and 
the plant was closed only after a few years of operation.  
  Productivism also hindered another socially useful form of production, public 
services and especially care services, as demonstrated in the previous chapter. Not only 
did the Labour Right in charge believe that public service spending should be cut in order 
to increase investment in private manufacturing sectors, many AESes had a similar 
orientation. The Left advocates of the AES or similar measures were not the staunchest 
advocates of public services and the social wage economy; the ideational paradigm in 
which public expenditure is seen as “unproductive” and “a residual in the arithmetic of 
capitalism” echoed the Labour government’s expenditure cuts.326 The most prominent 
leftist voice in the Cabinet, Tony Benn, was fervently manufacturing-oriented, while the 
ardent advocates for social wage such as Joan Lester did not gain a voice in the 
government at all. The dissonance between the AES visions of an alternative shared by 
many labor-leftist activists and the potential liberatory turn of the Social Contract created 
an impossibility to overcome the actually-practiced anti-worker version of the Social 
Contract except to return to free collective bargaining.  
 Working time reduction is another alternative agenda that is directly contradictory 
to productivism. In the 1970s, British unions generally did include working time 
reduction as one of their platforms as a way to decrease unemployment and the TUC 
coordinated the Working Time Campaign, but it was neither their priority nor integrated 
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into a wider framework of political economy. General support for the idea of working 
time reduction hardly translated into serious, prioritized campaigns, and there were few 
discussions of incorporating it in the Social Contract as an anti-unemployment measure. 
Working time reduction was also often used as a means for covert wage increases when 
they intended to seek overtime pay.327 The demand for 35 hours workweek was officially 
withdrawn by union leaders at the height of the Winter of Discontent in a meeting with 
Callaghan.328 The AES also did not give it a strong support because “’work sharing’ 
means wage sharing,” and the undesirability of such trade-off was seen as self-evident.329 
The exception was the engineering union’s (AUEW) strike in Summer 1979, in which the 
left-wing union leadership sought working time reduction to 35 hours without wage 
reduction, backed by solid rank-and-file support; they won a reduction to 39 hours, which 
is indeed significant in itself but did not prove to be a catalyst for a wider change.330 As 
was the case with AES, the union offensive on working time reduction did not gain the 
biggest momentum when labor was most powerful in the seventies, and withered away in 
the midst of profound offensive against labor in the eighties. In 1994, Britain had the 
highest proportion of workers working over 45 hours a week in wage labor, including 
more than 40% of male workers.331 
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Masculinism 
The politics of gender was implicated in numerous ways in ideologies of union 
voluntarism, productivism and the absence of profound transformation of political 
economy. Masculinist values in the Labour Party and the movement vitiated the general 
emancipatory impulses which are necessary for any transformative project on the Left, 
provided the discourses championing economistic priorities and free collective 
bargaining, and served to subordinate the social wage, the politics of working time and 
industrial democracy as relevant agendas. The masculinist conception of working-class 
interests and of the very identity of “workers” influenced the labor movements’ 
conceptions of their interests and trajectories of their policies; gendered biases in labor 
force and movements had widespread implications on the entire labor politics. 
The gender-restrictive workforce, which was built through the application of 
long-standing patriarchal values to the particular mode of production of the postwar 
period, created the hegemonic and often-subconscious conception in which 
workingmen’s interests are represented as the interests of the entire labor movements. 
The masculine conception was a consequence of, and reinforced, the institutional 
underrepresentation of women in the labor market and labor movements. Even after the 
years of the expansion of public sector unions which contributed to the rise in union 
representation of female workers, women comprised only 30% of the union membership 
and 11% of the executive members at the end of the 1970s; union density among women 
workers was 39.5%, while the comparable figure for male workers was 63.4%.332 
Proportion of women in skilled, higher-paid manual work was only 13.5% in 1971, and 
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less than 25% of female workers were in manufacturing sectors. Gender inequality in 
workforce, the male breadwinner model of social policy, low representation of women in 
trade unions, and their masculine culture and public image reinforced each other. While 
labor market participation of women dramatically expanded throughout the 1970s, it was 
gender-segregated, with women largely concentrated in low-paid and part-time jobs with 
fewer prospects of advancement and protection.  
The masculine discursive practices expressed as values of “workingmen” were 
practiced in the dominant shop-floor culture in manual production. The conceptions of 
working-class independence and freedom, which founded the basis of resistance against 
Taylorism, were also gendered and tied with the masculine role as a breadwinner and the 
freedom from constraints upon the exercise of masculine power, with the notion of 
feminine dependence often complementing masculine independence.333 Even though the 
masculinist image of militancy fueled labor struggles, especially in coal mining, 
masculinist culture developed as “a way of ‘compensating’” for their class-based 
oppression and alienation, and undermined its liberatory aspects.334 The conservative 
culture of “decency” and “respectability” based on the patriarchal family, with the 
cultural construction of masculinity as hierarchically-oriented, promoted the authoritarian 
values which conflicted with the ethos of autonomy. For example, even as workers 
articulated extensive criticisms of managers, “their concern to respect authority and to 
acknowledge the need for hierarchical discipline” was also present and stifled 
imaginations of a less hierarchical and coercive organization such as industrial 
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democracy.335 In a society with stratification within the working class, there can be no 
strong basis of the working-class solidarity without the ideas of liberation; hence, 
Thatcherism was an “authentic expression” of skilled working men’s economic 
individualism, as indicated in the voting patterns.336  
 “The conservative common sense of the common man earning his breadwinner’s 
corn” entrenched in trade unionism was implicated in the economistic sense of priorities, 
which were conducive to productivist policies and could only foment an opposition to the 
Social Contract without attempting to use them in a more creative way.337 The notion of 
family wage as a workingman’s right was entrenched in the unions since the early 20th 
century, when it served as a rallying slogan to demand wage increases for male workers; 
they largely won the claim for the family wage in the Fordist-Keynesian system.338 The 
structure and normative ideal of “family wage” associated with the duties of a male 
“breadwinner” predisposed the male-dominated union leadership towards quantitative 
goals of wage increase, as “men’s belief in their role as breadwinners has subordinated all 
other dimensions of their workplace politics to the politics of pay – their own pay.”339 As 
one female trade unionist simply noted, their “problem was that our movement was based 
on what you could get for the lads, and the lads wanted cash in their pockets.”340 Tom 
Litterick, a left-wing Labour MP critical of Callaghan, Healey and incomes policy, 
concisely put the masculinist-productivist common sense in his parliamentary speech in 
1976; “I assure the Chancellor that the British worker is a firm materialist when 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
335	  Campbell,	  Wigan	  Pier,	  220,	  Collinson,	  Managing,	  215,	  93	  
336	  Campbell,	  Wigan	  Pier,	  229	  	  
337	  Ibid.,	  149	  
338	  Hilary	  Land,	  “the	  Family	  Wage,”	  Feminist	  Review	  6	  (1980),	  55-­‐77.	  	  
339	  Ibid.,147	  	  
340	  Ibid.,148-­‐149	  
	   135	  
considering his own interests as expressed in the wage packet and what it can buy.”341 
The idea of family wage did not necessarily reflect the reality, since many women were 
indeed wage-earners and breadwinners, but it served to subordinate and ignore the social 
wage through the welfare state, prevented more egalitarian settlements of working time 
and perpetuated the gendered pay differentials which needed to be defended through free 
collective barganing.  
Many male trade unionists, including those in the leadership, did absorb the spirit 
and criticism of the revitalized feminist movements of the 1970s. Responding to the 
feminist union activists’ demand, the TUC adopted “Aims for Women at Work” in 1975, 
the twelve-point manifesto including equal pay and promotion, no discrimination, 
maternity leave and “convenient hours.”342 The TUC campaigned for the Equal Pay Act 
of 1975 enacted by the Labour government, and explicitly called for a universal, 
comprehensive childcare system and flexible working time in the Charter for Under Fives 
in 1978; the following year they adopted the Charter for Equality, including affirmative 
actions for women in managerial positions as well as TUC’s own decision-making 
bodies.343 Most remarkably, the TUC called a pro-choice march jointly with feminist 
groups to protest against the anti-abortion bill in 1979. As the second-wave feminism 
made a dramatic progress in the seventies Britain, trade unions were far from complacent 
or utterly dismissive.  
Nonetheless, the progress was far from adequate to overcome the long-standing 
masculinist paradigm. Despite their commitment to fighting for wage increases for 
women workers, cross-gender solidarity was not always prioritized, especially in the 
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crucial aspects of political economy. Female-dominant public sector unions were grossly 
underrepresented in the TUC’s senior committees; National and Local Government 
Officers’ Association (NALGO) and National Union of Public Employees (NUPE), the 
fourth and fifth largest unions, were entirely excluded the TUC committees which 
endorsed the retrenchment policies in 1975-76.344 The TUC leadership did not act on the 
anti-cuts motions often adopted at the TUC conferences, and the NUPE campaigns for 
the social services and social wage did not gain active support of other unions.345 Despite 
the feminist influences, the family wage assumptions were alive and well in many 
instances, such as taxation structures and social security, understanding of “full 
employment” as that of men, the dearth of social policy designed for dual-earner 
households and some blatant anti-feminist policies such as Callaghan’s 1977 attempt to 
direct child benefits to the breadwinner.  
The ideal employment pattern for the masculinist family wage model is 
bifurcation between full-time wage earners and non-participants in the labor market, 
divided based on gender. Therefore, work sharing that creates part-time jobs for most 
workers is anathema to the family wage model, which refuses to see part-time 
employment as “proper work” and justifies the low-pay and low status for female part-
time workers based on the oft-erroneous assumptions that they have another breadwinner 
to rely on.346 Working time reduction was also a less salient issue for men, since women 
were performing the overwhelming proportion of unpaid labor within households and 
men were performing far fewer hours of unpaid labor than the proletariat as a whole. The 
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sustainable offensive for working time reduction as a labor movement priority would 
need to treat all forms of work as a whole, including paid employment and unpaid labor 
inside households.347 
The tenet and structure of free collective bargaining was implicated in the 
workplace inequality between sexes and served to reinforce the patriarchal pay structures 
of the family wage.348 Collective bargaining without state intervention is not necessarily 
more patriarchal than the coordinated, corporatist arrangements – patriarchal biases in the 
state are well-documented – but “free collective bargaining” ended up benefitting the 
stronger, well-established and well-organized skilled workers at the expense of the 
majority of women workers, as claims for pay raises did not cover the lowest-paid and/or 
part-time occupations who were nonetheless impacted by inflation. Indeed, the TUC’s 
call for return to free collective bargaining entailed the “satisfactory restoration of 
differentials” based on “skill”, which was used as a heavily gendered concept.349 
Furthermore, the ideas of collective laissez-faire conflicted with the rights-based 
approach, which underlay the Equal Pay Act and is an important arena through which 
gender equality is sought. Masculinism led to the failure to conceive wage equalization – 
instead, the aim was to entrench “whole general philosophy of differentials in trade 
unionism,” which Castle described as “a pay-structure hierarchy which descended in the 
following order; skilled workers, semi-skilled labourers and women”.350  
The connections outlined above between masculinism and other issues should not 
be interpreted as a simplistic and essentialist equation of women’s interests with time, 
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social wage, coordinated political economy, lack of hierarchy and services, and men’s 
with money through wages, voluntarism, authoritarianism and manufacturing.351 Women 
workers fought hard in economistic struggles as well, and it would be absurd to claim that 
women are naturally more peaceful or less materialistic. It was in the context of a 
particular gender system that certain policies served male interests or were identified as 
masculine. Also, the dramatic expansion of women’s employment in recent decades that 
coincided with neoliberalism could seem to cast a doubt on the connection between 
masculinism and neoliberalism. As Nancy Fraser recently observed, feminist criticism of 
the family wage was adopted and twisted by neoliberalism; the laissez-faire economy 
substituted family wage jobs with insecure, low-wage, part-time employment, and 
channeled the spirit of liberation into the neoliberal flexible precarity as freedom.352 
However, new employment opportunities for women in neoliberalism were mostly 
without power, security or status, which was not the case in family wage jobs and would 
not have been the case in a comprehensive work-sharing scheme. Only the combination 
of feminism with the Left politics could have led to an alternative future. 
In July 1977, as the government attempted a new phase of the Social Contract that 
was breaking down, Barbara Castle eloquently described the spirit of the Social Contract 
and implications of its rise and fall. Castle was dismissed from the Cabinet immediately 
after Callaghan strode into No. 10 in April 1976. Her parliamentary speech, made two 
years before the fateful election, was prescient in a way that can only be appreciated by 
posterity; 
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“I	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  materialistic	  motivation	  is	  the	  only	  or	  even	  the	  most	  powerful	  
motivation	  in	  our	  society.	  If	  I	  believed	  that,	  I	  do	  not	  know	  why	  I	  should	  be	  in	  politics.	  If	  it	  is	  all	  so	  
mechanistic,	  why	  are	  we	  here?	  What	  are	  we	  arguing	  about?	  What	  is	  all	  human	  conversation	  and	  
human	  co-­‐operation	  about,	  if	  the	  mechanistic	  solution	  is	  the	  only	  one…	   
As	  the	  Right	  Hon.	  Lady	  [Margaret	  Thatcher]	  hinted,	  what	  she	  dislikes	  about	  [the	  Social	  
Contract]	  is	  that	  it	  brings	  organised	  workers	  into	  partnership,	  that	  it	  gives	  them	  a	  new	  status	  in	  
the	  management	  of	  the	  economy,	  in	  the	  running	  of	  our	  political	  life.	  In	  our	  view,	  that	  is	  its	  
greatest	  merit…	  What	  put	  an	  end	  to	  it?	  There	  is	  a	  simple	  answer.	  The	  Government	  did	  not—they	  
would	  say	  could	  not—keep	  their	  side	  of	  the	  bargain.	  Restraint	  had	  been	  accepted	  to	  safeguard	  
jobs,	  but	  unemployment	  increased.	  The	  rate	  of	  inflation	  was	  almost	  halved,	  but	  last	  year	  the	  
Government	  was	  forced…	  into	  abandoning	  social	  contract	  policies	  by	  the	  sort	  of	  ideology	  and	  
arguments…	  that	  were	  encouraged	  and	  applauded	  by	  the	  Leader	  of	  the	  Opposition	  who	  does	  not	  
want	  a	  more	  equal	  society...	  
I	  believe	  that	  the	  House	  and	  the	  country	  will	  live	  to	  regret	  bitterly	  that	  we	  disillusioned	  
working	  men	  and	  women	  with	  the	  results	  of	  the	  social	  contract.	  The	  alternative…	  is	  the	  cash	  
limit	  society	  [with	  strict	  limits	  on	  public	  expenditure]	  with	  all	  that	  that	  means;	  That	  is	  the	  choice	  
facing	  us	  on	  this	  side	  of	  the	  House.	  We	  either	  believe	  in	  different	  motivations	  and	  gear	  all	  our	  
policies	  around	  that	  belief,	  or	  we	  are	  forced	  into	  the	  mechanistic	  alternative.	  My	  message	  is	  that	  
we	  had	  better	  recapture	  our	  freedom	  as	  quickly	  as	  possible…	  the	  free	  market	  economy	  is	  one	  of	  
human	  bondage	  just	  as	  great	  as,	  in	  fact	  greater	  than,	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  men	  and	  women	  
freely	  decide	  to	  place	  constraints	  upon	  their	  market	  power	  in	  the	  distribution	  of	  awards	  and	  
wealth	  in	  society.”353	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Castle’s own idea of Social Contract was not the one in which human bondage of 
the market economy was minimized. Nonetheless, her exhortation to “recapture our 
freedom” in the wake of the retrenchment turn vividly captures a historical turning point. 
Productivist and masculinist ideologies propelled both the mainstream and leftist wings 
of Labour politics in Britain away from the vision of emancipatory industrial relations in 
a democratically coordinated economy. The freedom of an alternative was not captured in 
the seventies; after the waves of Thatcher, Blair and Cameron, it has still not been found.  
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Conclusion: How Did the Lights Go Out?  
“The seeds of 18 years of opposition were not sown in 1979, but in the 1960s, when great 
challenges came upon us. And instead of understanding we were simply being tested by 
the forces of change… but we were not ready then to see change was coming, accept it 
and then shape it to progressive ends. United, we should have been the advocates of 
economic and industrial change in the changing world.” – Tony Blair, 2005 Labour 
Party Conference Speech 
 
“When the Lights Went Out” – journalist Andy Beckett described the ‘70s Britain 
as such in his eponymous book. In the hegemonic discourse, the seventies is portrayed as 
the grimmest of all decades, “periods of national embarrasement, of slipping confidence, 
of decline, of crisis, both real and imagined.”354 To describe the decade of incredible 
turbulence, there could be no metaphor more perfect than the dark nights of the Three 
Day Week, caused by the miners’ strike in 1974. In the pervasive view, the economic 
crisis and the Left strength are conflated in the demonic imagery of the seventies, which 
have served to discredit advocacy for an expanded public role in economy through the 
tainted association with the dreadful decade.  
Capitalist crisis in the British seventies was real enough, and a crisis is always 
simultaneously an opportunity. The real tragedy of the British seventies was that even as 
a crisis coincided with the powerful labor and social movements, the lights of a more 
humane future - the hope and possibility that the realm of freedom could be nearer than it 
used to be – brightly sparked and then went out. The lights of emancipation were slowly 
extinguished as the decade went on, at least partly because the labor movements and the 
Labour Party chose to base their policies and actions upon their masculinism and 
productivism. Labour failed to absorb the New Left, post-materialist values into a 
coherent economic vision with a durable political paradigm based on a new configuration 
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of interests. Labour’s productivism – an idea that human well-being fundamentally 
depends on the level of material possessions and consumption, even in advanced 
capitalist societies – hindered their pursuit of liberatory goals that were perceived as 
adverse to maximum growth, such as reduction of working time and increased allocation 
of resources to social services as opposed to private manufacturing sectors. Because of 
the lack of focus on qualitative labor issues of power, autonomy and working time, 
unions were trapped in the dichotomy of inflationary wage offensive and self-defeating 
participation in the Social Contract. Labourist moderatism was reinforced by the 
productivist emphasis on the need to appease capital; Labour Right was the primary 
advocate of productivism, but it was an ideational hegemony because many on the Left 
also shared it. Their masculinism gave them a distorted view of priorities, and made them 
add feminist and ecological concerns in a superficial way as lip-service issues that don’t 
result in substantial policy integration. As the space to claim the values of post-Fordist 
“freedom” was left vacant by the economic Left, Thatcherism was able to establish the 
hegemonic equivalence between the discourse of “freedom” with neoliberal economics 
by twisting freedom into anti-statism and anti-unionism, and hence create a perceived 
antagonism between post-materialism and the Left. 
We currently live in the time of a structural capitalist crisis, whose economic 
anatomy and balance of political forces are distinct from those of the seventies. Due to 
the weakness of the Left, neoliberalism as a hegemonic paradigm is yet to be seriously 
contested in the political arena, after nearly three crisis years. Nonetheless, the vision of 
the alternative, non-productivist, non-masculinist political economy that we could aspire 
to does remain ever-relevant; especially, due to the impending planetary energy and 
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climate crisis, the shift to non-productivism is infinitely more imperative than it was in 
the seventies. We cannot construct an alternative, unless we reshape the values and 
purpose of political economy. Whatever the future brings us, the vista of liberation, the 
dream unfulfilled in the 1970s, is still waiting for us, if we can seize it. However, unless 
we can make an emancipatory turn within the new few decades, the 1970s will be 
remembered as the pinnacle of welfare society in the entire modern history and beyond, 
which was followed by the long, deep night of decline and decay. 
